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Chapter 1  General Introduction 
As of the late 1990s, Private Labels (PLs) have been of interest to researchers in economics and 
marketing. They command attention and generate discussion primarily because of the manners in 
which they differ from National brands (NBs). PLs have been especially successful in Western 
Europe, where their share in the total consumption of packaged goods is as high as 45% (Nielsen 
2014). Building the right PL program for the retailer is critical for its success in today’s highly 
competitive grocery industry. A report by IGD demonstrates the recent shift in industry thinking 
that consumers are not only interested in the price of a product, but also in the quality values of a 
store’s range (IGD 2011). Likewise, the Private Label Manufacturers Association (PLMA) states 
that “it is worthwhile for retailers to differentiate their PLs as ‘low-cost’, ‘standard’ and ‘premium’ 
products, in order to satisfy the heterogeneous nature of consumer demand as well as provide a 
‘quality’ point of differentiation compared to competitors” (PLMA 2011). Therefore, retailers no 
longer treat their store brand as one homogenous group and are offering three-tier PL products, 
ranging from cheap and low quality own labels (i.e., budget PLs) to somewhat less expensive and 
comparable quality PLs (i.e., standard PLs), to premium quality and high value added PLs that are 
not priced lower than national brands (NBs) (i.e., premium PLs) (Kumar and Steenkamp 2007).  
This dissertation extends the academic field by offering better insights in the popular 
retailers’ three-tier PL programs instead of considering PLs as one homogenous group. Despite 
the enormous and still growing success of PLs, several issues remain largely unexplored. First, 
within PL tier strategy, recently an increasing number of leading retailers have extended their PL 
tier offerings with new lines targeted at distinct consumer segments (IPLG Europe 2014), such as 
health and kids lines (e.g. Good For You at U.K. retailer Asda and Conad Kids at Italian retailer 
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Conad). Likewise, U.S. retailer Kroger has expanded its organic and healthy (standard and 
premium) PL lines recently (Market Watch 2012).  
The PL market challenges are very different for each of the three tiers: Industry observers 
increasingly state that economy PLs are facing important challenges for the industry. They are 
shrinking in volume sold as they fail to compete with discounters (IRI 2016). Moreover, they 
generate lower margins than standard PLs, and most importantly they can cannibalize the current 
PL offerings, which in turn leads to category profit erosion (ter Braak et al. 2013; IPLG 2016). 
Meanwhile, standard PL tier retains its popularity, and premium PLs are even growing, not only 
in size but also in value (IRI 2016). Together with the further proliferation in PL tier offerings, 
there is an ongoing discussion on how different PL tiers should be priced relative to each other and 
their NB competitors.  
PL tiers play an important role for the traditional retailers not only to compete with each 
other but also with other retailer format such as discounters. The rise of the discounters is a key 
driver of structural change within the grocery retailing (The Independent 2014). Their market 
shares range from around 10% to an astonishing 43% in Germany (Global Retail Mag 2014) and 
they are estimated to grow further in the future according to grocery think-thank IGD (Food 
Manufacture UK 2015). They compete on price, quality, consistency and simplicity. Discounters 
apply a no-frills approach, products are often displayed on the floor on pallets and retail-ready; 
half-sized pallets are used to further optimize floor space (Cleeren et al. 2010; AT Kearney 2011). 
Their sales rely primarily on private labels (PLs) and, recently, they started offering a limited 
number of national brands (NBs). Above all, prices are very low. By economizing on assortment 
and service, discounters are able to offer their PL products at rock-bottom prices (Lin et al. 2012). 
For the traditional retailers, the gains made by Aldi and Lidl have been like the arrival of a new 
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predator (BBC 2015). The boss of UK-based Morrisons declared that the competition from 
discount grocers Lidl and Aldi has thrown the supermarket industry into its biggest crisis since its 
birth in the 1950s (The Independent 2014). To fight back against discounters, and to better compete 
with other retailers, traditional retailers started to view their PLs more strategically and began to 
explore new growth opportunities via multi-tier PL strategies (Food Navigator 2015). 
While the popularity of PLs continues to grow, various government, regulatory and 
industry organisations have expressed their views on the impact of PL tiers on consumer welfare. 
Overall, economic theory and industry reports suggest that PL tier introductions benefit 
consumers, by providing them new products and improved value for money (Daskalova 2012). In 
addition to these direct benefits, consumers can be better off thanks to increased competition in 
the market since they force the incumbents’ products to compete more vigorously in terms of 
offering higher quality, increased level innovation, and lower prices (Oxera 2010). On the other 
hand, the competition authorities have been increasingly concerned whether retailers could use PL 
tiers to harm competition by raising prices or reducing the shelf space available for NBs 
(Daskalova 2012). The current dissertation will therefore aim to shed more light on these issues as 
well. 
Contribution of this Dissertation 
This dissertation aims to contribute to the literature in multiple ways. To the best of our 
knowledge, we are the first to study the demand implications of (i) further line proliferation within 
PL tiers and (ii) different PL tier price settings. Moreover, besides the demand implications of 
further proliferation and price decisions within the multi-tier PL strategy, we derive what happens 
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to a retailer’s profits, addressing the recent call for more PL studies on profit implications (see 
Sethuraman and Gielens 2014). 
Second, our focus is to shed light on the role of PL tiers in the competition between hard 
discounters and traditional retailers. We identify (i) which PL tier is the most effective for the 
traditional retailers in the battle with the discounters; (ii) how traditional retailers should adjust the 
pricing of their PLs and NBs to respond to the discounter threat; and (iii) whether discounters 
should expand the NB presence in their stores to further steal demand from the traditional retailers? 
Our work builds on two streams of literature. The first stream focuses on PL tiers, but ignores 
competition across retailers. Therefore, we are – to the best of our knowledge – the first to 
investigate the inter-tier competition across retailers, by adding the retailer dimension in our study. 
The second related literature stream bears on retailer (format) competition, without considering 
the role of PL tiers. Hence, we are the first to systematically investigate the role of PL tiers in 
retailer (format) competition in the context of traditional versus discount retail formats. 
Third, in contrast to previous literature that mainly focus on the sales and performance 
implications of the PL tiers either from the manufacturer or retailer side, this dissertation also 
focuses on the third party involved, the consumer. The European Commission has put consumer 
welfare at the top of its competition law objectives (Olbrich et al. 2009). Hence, the insights from 
this study can help competition authorities to assess whether the introduction of economy and 
premium PL tiers are welfare enhancing.  
Dissertation Outline 
This dissertation contains three main chapters that focus on (i) the impact of PL proliferation and 
pricing on consumer demand, (ii) the role of PL tiers in the competition between discounters and 
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traditional retailers and (iii) the impact of PL tier introductions on consumer welfare. Despite their 
common focus on impact of PL tiers, each chapter is self-contained and investigates the impact of 
PL tiers on different parties (e.g. retailer or consumers). Hence, they can be read independently. 
Each chapter starts with its own introduction and ends with a conclusion and/or discussion of the 
major findings. 
Chapter 2- “Private Label Line Proliferation and Private Label Tier Pricing: A New 
Dimension of Competition between Private Labels and National Brands”- studies how do the 
different PL tiers/lines compete with each other and with the existing NBs in the assortment? And, 
how does this PL-NB competition influence consumer demand and retailer's profits? Recently, an 
increasing number of leading retailers have extended their PL tier offerings with new alternatives 
targeted to distinct consumer segments (IPLG Europe 2014), such as health and kids lines (e.g. 
Good For You at U.K. retailer Asda and Conad Kids at Italian retailer Conad). Likewise, U.S. 
retailer Kroger has expanded its organic and healthy (standard and premium) PL lines recently 
(Market Watch 2012). Hence, this PL proliferation to new quality tiers (i.e. economy, standard and 
premium) and the further line proliferation within each tier pose challenges to a retailer's PL-NB 
portfolio management and price setting. This chapter also takes into account whether retailers can 
set more competitive prices for their PL tiers to increase their profitability. For example, industry 
observers increasingly state that economy PLs are shrinking in volume sold since they fail to 
compete with discounters (IRI 2016). Moreover, they generate lower margins than standard PLs 
and most importantly they can cannibalize the current PL offerings that in the end leads category 
profit erosion (ter Braak et al. 2013; IPLG 2016). For this purpose, by using a representative 
household panel dataset (2008-2009) for the ready to eat (RTE) cereal category of two leading 
U.K. grocery retailers, we derive the demand and profit effects under the following set of scenarios: 
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(i) dropping or adding a line (kids, health or muesli) within a PL tier and (ii) changing the PL tier 
prices.  
Chapter 3- “The Battle of Traditional Retailers versus Discounters: The Role of PL Tiers” 
investigates how PL tiers (i.e. economy, standard and premium) affect the competition between 
discounters and traditional retailers. For grocery retailers in Europe, intense competition from hard 
discount formats like Lidl and Aldi is an established part of the competitive landscape. As discount 
grocery retailers increasingly meet the needs of European consumers, traditional retailers are 
seeing their profits plummet and market shares shrink (BCG 2016). Due to the highly competitive 
retail environment, traditional retailers’ private label (PL) tiers are now set to become the new 
battle ground in this competition. We use a representative UK household panel dataset (2009-
2010) for the ready-to-eat cereal and canned soup category, and estimate a demand model for the 
choice between national brands (NBs) and PL tiers across the top-7 UK retailers. Using our 
demand estimates, we conduct several counterfactual experiments that predict consumer responses 
to different strategies of traditional retailers and discounters in their fight for the consumer. In 
particular, we compare the effectiveness of three types of PLs offered by traditional retailers to 
fight discounters: economy PLs versus standard PLs versus premium PLs. 
Chapter 4- “Do Consumers Benefit from an Economy and Premium Private Label 
Introduction? Evidence from the U.K.” explores the consumer welfare effect of economy and 
premium PL introduction in the ready-to-eat cereal and soup category in the U.K. market 
respectively. While popularity of PLs keeps growing, the past decade has seen growing antitrust 
concerns about the impact of PLs on consumer welfare and competition in the grocery sector 
(Daskalova 2012). In fact, competition authorities in Europe increasingly raise their concerns 
around the effect of recent PL tier introductions on consumer welfare. In addition to NB pricing, 
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retailers have full control over pricing of PLs. PLs differ in size, nature and quality between 
supermarket chains which makes it difficult for consumers to engage in price comparison. This 
reduced transparency tends to soften price competition between the PLs of different retail chains 
and eventually harms consumer welfare (UK Competition Commission Grocery Market Inquiry 
2008). Hence, considering the competition authorities’ welfare concerns and the recent calls for 
more consumer welfare-oriented research by industry observers (Hyman et al. 2010), this study 
aims to shed light on the effect of PL tier introductions on consumer welfare. 
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Chapter 2  Private Label Line Proliferation and Private Label Tier 
Pricing: A New Dimension of Competition between Private 
Labels and National Brands1 
2.1 Introduction  
One of the most salient changes in the grocery environment is the success of private labels (PLs). 
Since a large number of FMCG categories now already have at least one PL, retailers are increasingly 
adopting a multi-tiered PL strategy. In practice, this often means a switch from a single standard 
product offering to a three-tiered PL portfolio. This ranges from the typical cheap and low quality 
own labels (i.e., economy PLs) to somewhat less expensive PLs comparable in quality to the national 
brands (NBs) (i.e., standard PLs), to premium quality and high value added PLs (i.e., premium PLs) 
(Kumar and Steenkamp 2007). With this strategy retailers can satisfy the heterogeneous nature of 
consumers, and further create differentiation compared to their competitors (IRI 2016). For instance, 
Italian retailer Conad states that they grew in all channels primarily thanks to a multi-tier PL program, 
which they started a few years ago (Global Retail Mag 2013). Examples of retailers who launched a 
new economy or premium PL tier are international grocery chain 7-Eleven (Just Food 2015) in U.S. 
and Korean retailer Lotte (IGD 2014). In the same spirit, recently an increasing number of leading 
retailers have extended their PL tier offerings with new alternatives targeted to distinct consumer 
segments (IPLG Europe 2014), such as health and kids lines (e.g. Good For You at U.K. retailer Asda 
and Conad Kids at Italian retailer Conad). Likewise, U.S. retailer Kroger has expanded its organic 
and healthy (standard and premium) PL lines recently (Market Watch 2012). In the meantime, 
                                                 
1 This chapter was written together with my supervisors Frank Verboven and Lien Lamey. It was published in Journal of 
Retailing and Consumer Services 36 (2017): 39-52.  
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industry observers increasingly state that economy PLs are facing big challenges. They are shrinking 
in volume sold since they fail to compete with discounters (IRI 2016). Moreover, they generate lower 
margins than standard PLs and most importantly they can cannibalize the current PL offerings that in 
the end leads category profit erosion (ter Braak et al. 2013; IPLG 2016). On the other hand, standard 
PL tier keeps its popularity and premium PLs is actually growing not only in size but also in value 
(IRI 2016). That brings us to evaluate what is the impact of this further proliferation within the tiers 
on consumer demand and retailer profits. In other words, whether new line introductions or delistings 
within different tiers help retailers. Together with this further proliferation in PL tier offerings, there 
is an ongoing discussion on how different PL tiers should be priced relative to each other and their 
NB competitors. The top retailers in U.K. (i.e. Tesco, Sainsbury’s and Asda) have increased the price 
of economy PLs more than 40 per cent on average (Daily Mail 2012). Likewise, according to IRI, 
U.K. shopping basket data show that prices of standard PL items are slowly getting closer to NBs’ 
prices (Just Food 2013; IRI 2016). Similarly, although industry observers advise the retailers to set 
their premium PLs price more than NB counterparts, there is still little known about how premium 
PLs should be priced (Millward Brown 2008 and World Trademark Review 2012).  
Hence, this PL proliferation to new quality tiers (i.e. economy, standard and premium) and the 
further line proliferation within each tier pose challenges to a retailer's PL-NB portfolio management 
and price setting. Within a retailer, how do the different PL tiers/lines compete with each other and 
with the existing NBs in the assortment? And, how does this PL-NB competition influence consumer 
demand and retailer's profits? To answer these questions, we estimate a rich discrete choice demand 
model at the consumer level. The adopted approach allows us to derive demand and profit implications 
for different scenarios by calculating counterfactuals. More specifically, we derive the demand and 
profit effects under the following set of scenarios: (i) dropping or adding a line (kids, health or muesli) 
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within a PL tier and (ii) changing the PL tier prices. By predicting consumer purchase adjustments to 
these changes in a retailer’s PL-NB portfolio, we can define which PL/NB tiers and lines win or lose 
in terms of demand. Moreover, we derive what happens to a retailer’s profits, addressing the recent 
call for more PL studies on profit implications (see Sethuraman and Gielens 2014). 
Insights on PL tiers in the academic literature are limited, as the majority of articles studying 
PLs do not make the distinction between different PL tiers. These studies regard PLs as one group 
(e.g. Lamey et al. 2012; Steenkamp and Geyskens 2014), or consider one specific tier (e.g. Pauwels 
and Srinivasan 2004). Nonetheless, ter Braak et al. (2014) study the category drivers of premium PL 
introduction. Among other things, they find that retailers are more likely to introduce premium PLs 
in categories with a more proliferated assortment in terms of standard PLs, still being aware of 
creating PL fatigue. Based on online experiments, Plameira and Thomas (2011) showed that 
consumers’ quality perceptions of a premium PL increase in the presence of a value PL, whereas 
quality perceptions of a value PL are not affected by the presence of a premium PL alternative. In 
addition, Geyskens and colleagues (2010) show that, based on a brand-choice model with context 
effects, the introduction of an economy PL cannibalizes the incumbent standard PL but benefits the 
mainstream NBs. Similarly, an introduction of a premium PL cannibalizes the incumbent PLs (i.e. 
budget and standard) and sometimes benefits premium-quality NBs. Gielens (2012) studies the impact 
of PL and NB introductions on category sales and the share of the top-3 NBs and the three PL tiers 
(aggregated over brand variants). She finds, among other things, that new products introduced by 
standard PLs and premium PLs are sometimes able to boost category sales, to shrink NB rivals’ shares, 
and to cannibalize other PL tiers (respectively, economy and premium, and only economy), whereas 
new products introduced under the economy PL flag only stimulates overall economy PL share. We 
contribute to this literature stream in multiple ways. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to 
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study the demand implications of (i) further line proliferation within PL tiers (rather than PL tier 
introductions (see Geykens et al. 20102 & Palmeira and Thomas 2011) – or new product introductions 
within a PL tier (see Gielens 2012)) and (ii) different PL tier price settings. Finally, besides the 
demand implications of further proliferation and price decisions within the multi-tier PL strategy, we 
study the profit implications for the retailer.   
In sum, the study aims to answer the following research questions: How do PL lines/ tiers and 
NBs compete within a retailer? What are the demand and profit implications of this competition for 
the retailer? The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief 
overview of the data, followed by a section that presents the empirical framework with more detail 
regarding the method of estimation. In section 2.4, we present the empirical results. In section 2.5, 
what-if scenarios are discussed in detail. Finally, we conclude with discussion, limitations and ideas 
for further research in section 2.6. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Compared to Geyskens et al. (2010), we consider a lower level of aggregation in our demand model, where we only 
aggregate across different product sizes but not brand variants (i.e. different formulation, taste, …). This allows us to 
study the introduction and delisting of PL lines within each PL tier. Second, our model allows consumers’ price sensitivity 
to differ not only between consumers but also between brand types (i.e. NB vs. PL), quality tiers (i.e. low, medium and 
high) and lines (i.e. kids, health), allowing us to better capture the implications of price changes.  In addition, Geyksens 
et al. (2010) ignore the observations in which no purchase occurs in the category at the retailer, which is problematic due 
to informative-missingness (Chib, Seetharaman and Strijnev 2004). As such, our model is extended with an outside good 
option that captures the consumers’ decision to purchase in the category at another retailer, and thus allows consumers to 
switch to offerings of competing retailers in response to an assortment or price changes at the focal retailer (Chintagunta, 
Bonfrer and Song 2002), which again results in more realistic substitution patterns. Finally, whereas Geyskens et al. 
(2010) study demand shifts due to an introduction of an economy and premium PL tier over time (going from 1993 to 
2006), our study studies consumer demand in a setting where all three PL tiers and its lines are already well-established 
in the market (i.e. 2008-2009). 
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2.2 Data  
Research Context 
To study the competition between PLs and NBs, we obtained U.K. household panel data from Kantar 
Worldpanel through AiMark. This panel data consists of purchase records of a representative set of 
2,353 U.K. households that shop in the ready to eat cereal (RTE) cereal category for the period 
between 1 January, 2008 and 31 December, 2009.   
The U.K. has one of the strongest PL presences in Europe and is considered as the most 
advanced and sophisticated PL country globally with a (volume) market share of over 45% (IRI 2015; 
PLMA 2016). One of the most distinctive features of the U.K. grocery market is that PLs present in 
virtually every product category for several decades (Burt 2000). Hence, in our estimation window, 
the U.K. Market is already a mature PL market where all the brand introductions were made several 
years ago and consumers are well aware of the three PL tiers and theirs line extensions. According to 
industry observers, many countries are headed towards the U.K. model (Cotterill 1997), which makes 
our time window representative for other countries moving slower in their PL lines development. In 
our observation period, economy, standard and premium PLs cover respectively 2.96%, 23.64% and 
0.27% of the RTE cereal volume sales across all retailers. The outstanding success of PLs in the U.K. 
can largely be attributed to the fact that 74% of the retail grocery market is held by the top four 
retailers (The Guardian 2013). Indeed, the empirical literature and the industry findings show that the 
level of concentration in the retail market is directly related to the market share of PLs in total retail 
sales (Bozhinova 2014; Tarziján 2003; Nielsen 2014). High concentration in grocery retailing is the 
key factor behind the high market share of PLs in UK (PWC 2011). Hence the current PL market 
structure, where these multi-tiered PL offerings are pioneered (Kumar and Steenkamp 2007) makes 
U.K. an interesting place to study. 
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In our analysis, we focus on two of the three largest retailers in the U.K. grocery market, 
namely Asda and Sainsbury’s. Asda (Sainsbury’s) is the second (third) largest retailer in the U.K. 
grocery market with 525 (597) stores and a market share of 17.1 (16.4%) in 2016 (Asda Supplier 
2016; J Sainsbury plc 2016). Both retailers offer a popular PL assortment fitting into the 3-tier ranging 
strategy: ‘Good’ (i.e. (Asda’s) Smart Price, Sainsbury’s Basics), ‘Better’ (i.e. (Asda’s) Chosen by 
You, Sainsbury’s) and ‘Best’ (i.e. (Asda’s) Extra Special, (Sainsbury’s) Taste the Difference), 
accounting for 45.8% at Asda and 50.8% at Sainsbury’s of total volume sales (The Grocer 2014).  
To answer our research questions, we obtained data for the RTE cereal category. The RTE 
cereal category is a large, mature category for both PLS and NBs, where more than 40% of U.K. 
consumers regularly buy PLs (YouGov 2013). The RTE cereal category consists of a large number 
of brand variants (e.g. honey, chocolate, blueberry) grouped within multiple lines3 (e.g. kids, health, 
muesli) of several PLs and NBs in the different quality tiers, making it a perfect category to study the 
competition between PLs and NBs across tiers, lines and brand variants. Importantly, no re-brandings 
of PLs and NBs, or major PL or NB entries or exits occurred in our two-year observation period.  
Level of Aggregation  
The majority of marketing studies aggregate SKU’s at the brand level (see for instance Geyskens et 
al. 2010, Horsky et al. 2012 and Gordon et al. 2013). In our research setting, where we focus on brand 
variants to derive competition, this would lead to an aggregation bias. In fact, SKU’s in the RTE 
cereal category varies in terms of size, flavour and main ingredient (i.e. corn, barley, oat). But, even 
more importantly, each SKU (irrespective of size) of the same brand considerably varies in terms of 
                                                 
3 Some brand variants are classified to more than one line. In Sainsbury’s, 7% of the brand variants are classified as both 
muesli and healthy cereal. In Asda, we don’t see such overlapping. 
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its pricing. Therefore, we only aggregate SKUs across sizes and not across brand variants, and call it 
"brand variant".4  
In line with Empen et al. (2011), we select for each retailer all brand variants with a volume 
share above 0.5%.5 This results in 63 (57) selected brand variants at Asda (Sainsbury’s) which belong 
to four NB mother brands, namely Kellogg’s, Nestle and Weetabix, Quaker and all PL tiers, 
accounting for 79 (82%) of the RTE cereal category volume sales at Asda (Sainsbury’s).  
We adopt the expert-based classification used by Geyskens et al. (2010) to group each brand 
variant into a quality tier, i.e. low, medium or high. Taking into account the brand type (i.e. NB vs. 
PL), this results in five groups: mainstream NB (medium quality, i.e. Nestlé & Weetabix), premium 
NB (high quality; i.e. Kellogg’s), economy PL (low quality; i.e. Sainsbury’s Basics), standard PL 
(medium quality) and premium PL (high quality). Table 2-1 gives an overview of the average price 
paid, market share and level of proliferation for each group and each retailer. Overall, the economy 
PLs are standing at the bottom-of-the-market as a lowest priced option, followed by the standard PLs 
and subsequently premium PLs are positioned close to NBs, which is in line with Kumar and 
Steenkamp (2007). The number of brand variants and SKUs are comparable for standard PL, 
mainstream NB and premium NBs, while it is considerably lower for economy and premium PLs. At 
both retailers PLs have a combined (volume) market share above 40% (i.e. 47.7% at Asda and 44% 
at Sainsbury’s). Despite these overall similarities, the chosen PL price strategy clearly differs between 
both retailers. The price gaps between the different PL tiers at Asda are much smaller than at 
                                                 
4 For instance, under the mother brand flag Kellogg’s, Kellogg’s Special K brand offers the following brand variants 
among others: Kellogg’s Special K (regular), Kellogg’s Special K Red Fruit, Kellogg’s Special K Yogurt, where the 
different package sizes (e.g. Kellogg’s Special K Red Fruit 500g and 300g) are aggregated within a brand variant. 
5 For the premium PL tier, we relaxed this rule and include all PL brands (and its corresponding brand variants) where the 
combined market share of all brand variants is above 0.5%, in order to include sufficient PL premium alternatives in our 
analysis.  
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Sainsbury’s, whereas the Sainsbury’s PL tier prices cover a much broader spectrum going from 0.87 
for their economy PLs to 2.87 for the premium PLs compared to 1.00 and 2.41, respectively, at Asda. 
In addition, the Asda assortment is more proliferated in terms of the number of SKUs. The only 
exception is the premium tier, where Asda only offers 3 cereal alternatives compared to 27 at 
Sainsbury’s.  
Table 2-1 Summary statistics 
  
Mean Price  
(price per kilo) 
Market Share 
(volume) 
# Brand Variants # SKUs 
  Sainsbury’s Asda Sainsbury’s Asda Sainsbury’s Asda Sainsbury’s Asda 
Economy PL 0.87 1 4.23% 7.00% 4 8 20 46 
Standard PL 1.98 2.06 34.02% 40.40% 15 23 145 283 
Premium PL 2.87 2.41 6.15% 0.30% 6 2 27 3 
Mainstream NB 3.54 3.63 27.48% 21.60% 20 15 146 189 
Premium NB 3.7 3.45 28.12% 30.60% 12 12 144 225 
 
We further classify each brand variant in lines. More specifically, we distinguish brand 
variants into kids, health, muesli and regular RTE cereal lines. Brand variants are classified as a “kids” 
line alternative if the product package carries a picture of a cartoon or another kids friendly image 
(Ulger, 2008). Cereals based on raw rolled oats and other ingredients including grains, fresh or dried 
fruits, seeds and nuts, are classified as “muesli” cereals. To determine whether the alternative is 
healthy or not, we check whether brand variants are advertised as a healthy cereal with a specific 
name/range (e.g. Kellogg’s Red Berry Special K, Sainsbury’s Be Good To Yourself range) and/or 
whether they are emphasizing the health on its packaging (e.g. ‘good source of fibre’ or ‘made with 
wholegrain’). 
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Household Selection  
In line with Seetharaman (2004) and Geyskens et al. (2010), we exclude households that did not 
purchase one of the selected brand variants at least four times per year, on average, as well as 
households for which the selected brand variants did not represent minimum 70% of their yearly 
category purchases at the retailer.  
2.3 Methodology  
Demand Model 
To answer our research questions, we apply a rich random coefficients logit model for the RTE 
category for each retailer. The indirect latent utility of household 𝑖 from buying brand variant 𝑗 during 
weekly shopping trip 𝑡 at the retailer is given by6: 
  𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 (1) 
where 𝛾𝑖𝑗 denotes a household i’s valuation for brand variant j  (relative to the base option which is 
outside good). The assortment variable 𝑋𝑗𝑡 
7 quantifies the number of SKU’s available for brand 
variant 𝑗, and 𝛽𝑖 captures a household i’s valuation with respect to the assortment variable. 
Furthermore, 𝑝𝑗𝑡 is average price paid across all households for brand variant 𝑗 at week t, converted 
                                                 
6 For some households in certain weeks, multiple shopping trips within a week are observed, which is the case for 40.75% 
of the observed shopping trips. In this case we only selected the first shopping trip of the specific week for analysis. 
However, the same substantive findings are obtained (i) if we allow for daily instead of weekly shopping trips, or (ii) if 
these multiple weekly observations for a household are retained by using different household id’s for each additional 
shopping trip with a week but with identical household characteristics. In addition, some households buy multiple brand 
variants at the same weekly shopping trip, which is the case for 22,38% of the observed shopping trips. For the sake of 
simplicity, we only included the first brand variant registered in the panel dataset for that household at the specific at 
Sainsbury’s. However, similar findings are obtained if we randomly select a brand variant out of all brand variants bought 
by a household at a specific shopping trip.  
7 The competitive effects such as the assortment depth of other PL tiers and NB tiers are not directly entering the utility 
in Equation (1). However, they affect the choice probabilities. 
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in real terms using the yearly U.K. consumer price index obtained from the Office for National 
Statistics in the U.K., and 𝛼𝑖 is a household-specific valuation of price. 𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 denotes a dynamic loyalty 
variable, suggested by Guadagni and Little (2008) and specified as: 
 𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜆𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 (2) 
where 𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to 1 when brand variant 𝑗 was last purchased at 
the retailer, and 0 otherwise, 𝜆 is a smoothing constant between 0 and 18 (see Melis et al. 2015 for a 
similar practice). Hence, the parameter 𝜃𝑖 captures a household's "loyalty" or "switching cost" of 
moving from one brand variant to another (Gordon et al. 2013; Guadagni and Little 2008). 
Unobserved brand variant characteristics, 𝜉𝑗𝑡, may include brand variant image, quality and assigned 
shelf space. Finally, 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a household i specific valuation for brand variant 𝑗 in week t i.e. the “logit 
error term”. It is identically and independently distributed across brand variants according to the Type 
I extreme value distribution. 
In order for our model to yield plausible and realistic substitution patterns among the brand 
variants offered by the focal retailer, it is necessary to include an "outside good" option (Nevo 2001). 
In our research setting, the outside good option (𝑗 = 0) for the brand-variant choice decision is to 
purchase cereal from any other grocery retailer in the U.K. market. Without incorporating the 
existence of an outside good option, a simultaneous increase in the price of all brand variants offered 
by our focal retailer would result in no change in total consumption at the retailer. This would ignore 
the fact that consumers are able to buy their cereals at competing retailers.  
We consider a specification that allows for both observed and unobserved household 
heterogeneity regarding the valuations of alternatives. The alternative j evaluations, 𝛾𝑖𝑗, and the price 
                                                 
8 In line with prior research (Spotts 2014; Gupta 1988 and Kalwani et al. 1990), the smoothing constant is set equal to 0.7. 
Still, the same substantive findings are obtained for alternative smoothing constants (0.6, 0.75 and 0.87).  
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sensitivity, 𝛼𝑖, may depend on both observed household characteristics and unobserved heterogeneity. 
Based prior literature and data availability, we include the following observed household 
characteristics: Number of Childreni, Social Classi (i.e. lower versus middle versus upper), Average 
Buying Frequencyi and Share of Walleti. Average Buying Frequencyi denotes how many times on 
average a household shops for cereal at Sainsbury’s during a 4-week time window (Bodapati and 
Gupta 2005). Share of Walleti represents the household’s average spending on cereal in the focal 
retailer relative to all other U.K. retailers (Ailawadi et al. 2008; Gordon et al. 2013). Unobserved 
heterogeneity is incorporated through a random coefficient approach.  
With regard to the valuations for the different alternatives, we specify two terms: one for the 
outside good (3) and one for the brand variants (4): 
                     𝛾𝑖0 = 𝛾0
0 +  𝛾0
𝜎𝜈𝑖
𝑟              𝑣𝑖~𝑁(0,1)    (3) 
 𝛾𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾𝑗
0 + ∑ ∑ 𝛾ℎ𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟ℎ𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝐺𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑝
𝑝ℎ
 (4) 
where 𝛾𝑗
0 captures the means of the distributions of heterogeneity across households with respect to 
intrinsic brand variant 𝑗 preferences. In order to capture the observed heterogeneity for the valuation 
of product group dummy variables, we interact product group dummies (𝑃𝐺𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑝) with household 
characteristics 𝐻𝐻𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟ℎ𝑖, where 𝑝 is an index for the product groups and ℎ𝑖 is an index for observed 
household characteristics. 9, 10 
With regard to the valuation of price, we specify the price coefficient as: 
 𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼
0 + ∑ 𝛼ℎ𝐻𝐻𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟ℎ𝑖 + 𝛼
𝜎𝜈𝑖
𝑟                    𝑣𝑖~𝑁(0,1)    
ℎ
 (5) 
                                                 
9 The product group dummies refers to both (i) line dummies (i.e. kids, muesli and health) and (ii) group dummies (i.e. 
brand type vs. quality tiers) (i.e. economy PL, standard PL, premium PL, mainstream NB and premium NB). 
10 The mean valuation of the product group dummies was dropped from the model due to multicollinearity problems as 
individual brand variant dummies are also included in the model. 
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where 𝛼0 is the mean responsiveness to the price, common across households. To account for 
observed heterogeneity, we interact price with the above mentioned observed household 
characteristics 𝐻𝐻𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟ℎ𝑖. To account for unobserved heterogeneity, we use a random coefficient 
specification for price (Chintagunta et al. 2002). Here, 𝛼𝜎 is the standard deviation around the mean 
valuation of price and 𝜐𝑖 is a random draw from the standard normal distribution, capturing 
unobserved household heterogeneity regarding price11. 
Estimation 
Based on the model assumptions, the probability that household 𝑖 with unobservable characteristic 
vector 𝑣𝑖 chooses the brand variant 𝑗 that maximizes utility among all the available alternatives is 
given by: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗(𝑣𝑖) =
exp (𝛾𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡)
1 + ∑ exp ( 𝛾𝑖𝑘 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑘𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑝𝑘𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡)
𝐽
𝑘=1
 (6) 
These choice probabilities can be integrated over the unobserved and normally distributed 
term 𝑣𝑖, to obtain average choice probabilities for each household. We then estimate the model with 
simulated maximum likelihood as in Chintagunta and Dube (2005) and Train (2003). To approximate 
the integral in the choice probability, we take 100 draws for 𝜐𝑖 from the standard normal distribution 
(see Appendix for the details).  
 
 
                                                 
11 In the special case where 𝛼𝜎 = 0, there is no unobserved heterogeneity and we would obtain the conditional logit 
model. 
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Counterfactuals  
To conduct our counterfactuals, we compute diversion ratios to compute how closely brand variants 
and product groups compete with each other; and its corresponding profit implications.  
Diversion ratio. A diversion ratio quantifies the proportion of demand captured by the 
different alternatives in the market when price of one of the alternatives is changed (see Kelchtermans 
and Verboven (2007) and Conlon and Mortimer (2013) for an in-depth discussion). A practical 
advantage of the diversion ratio is that it is a unit free measure, which captures the relative degree of 
competition between products very well. As such, it gives similar magnitudes when one considers 
substitution responses to small or larger price changes, or to an entire product elimination. We 
consider here the effect of an elimination of all brand variants in group 𝛿1 (i.e. dropping a tier) from 
the retailer’s assortment, which is the special case where the prices in the group become infinitely 
large. In this case, 𝐷𝑅𝛿1𝛿2 measures the fraction of demand lost from the eliminated group 𝛿1 that 
flows back to the group 𝛿2.  
 
𝐷𝑅𝛿1𝛿2 =
∑ ∑ (𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑘∈𝛿2 (𝒑
𝟏) − 𝑠𝑖𝑘(𝒑
𝟎)𝑖 )
∑ ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗(𝑗∈𝛿1 𝒑
𝟎)𝑖
 (7) 
The initial price vector 𝒑𝟎 consists of the current prices of all brand variants, and the new price 
vector 𝒑𝟏 sets the price to infinity for the eliminated brands j in the group 𝛿1. For example, to capture 
the demand implications of a PL tier line delisting, the prices of all brand variants within this PL tier 
line are replaced with a very high price (such that its demand 𝑠𝑗(𝒑
𝟏) becomes zero where 𝑠𝑗(𝒑
𝟏) =
∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗(𝒑
𝟏)𝑖 ) while keeping the prices of the other brand variants at the same level in the new price 
vector. The diversion ratios measure the percentage of PL tier line demand that goes to each brand 
variant. Similarly, to capture the demand implications of an introduction of a PL tier line, we generate 
a hypothetical price level, assortment level and loyalty value for all new brand variants within this PL 
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tier line12. Note that the diversion ratio formula (7) is a special case of a finite price increase for the 
products in group 𝛿1. 13 We finally point out that the concept of the diversion ratio is closely related 
to own- and cross-price elasticities14 (see e.g. Werden (1998)). In both cases, the prices of rival 
products are kept fixed; in profit counterfactuals, one can allow prices of rivals to respond.  
 Profit. We also consider the profit incentives for eliminating (i) a group of brand variants, and 
(ii) changing the price gap between PL tiers and NB tiers. In order to calculate the net effects on 
category profit, we supplement our data with the external margin information15 𝑚𝑗
0 = (𝑝𝑗
0 − 𝑐𝑗)/𝑝𝑗
0 
that allows us to derive wholesale price 𝑐𝑗. For PL tiers, we obtained average margin data per brand 
type & tier for our focal category (i.e. RTE cereal) from AiMark (for a comparable retailer in the 
Dutch market) together with the accompanying standard deviation. Retailers’ percentage profit 
margins 𝑚𝑗
0 are 21.6% for economy PLs, 34.5% for standard PLs and 28.3% for premium PLs on 
average. Similarly, for NBs, it is 20%. Suppose that there is a price increase of all brands j in group 
𝛿1 (either a finite price increase, or an infinite increase in case the product is eliminated). The change 
in profits from such a price increase or delisting of the brand variants in group 𝛿1 is as follows: 
                                                 
12 For instance, to construct the prices of newly introduced economy PL kids alternatives, first we calculate the ratio 
between standard PL regular and standard PL kids alternatives, Then, multiply this ratio with economy PL regular 
alternatives to construct economy PL kids prices.  
13 In the more general case of a finite price change of the alternatives in a group, the relevant formula  for the diversion 
ratio is: 𝐷𝑅𝛿1𝛿2 = −
∑ ∑ (𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑘∈𝛿2
(𝒑𝟏)−𝑠𝑖𝑘(𝒑
𝟎)𝑖 )
∑ ∑ (𝑠𝑖𝑗(𝑗∈𝛿1
𝒑𝟏)−𝑠𝑖𝑗(𝒑
𝟎))𝑖
. If we eliminate the entire group (by setting the 𝑝𝑗 = ∞), then 𝑠𝑗(𝒑
𝟏) =
∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗(𝒑
𝟏)𝑖  = 0, so that we obtain (7). 
14 If we denote the own-price elasticity of product A by 𝜀𝐴 and the cross-price elasticity of product B’s demand with 
respect to A’s price by  𝜀𝐵𝐴), then the diversion ratio becomes the following: 
 
∆𝑞𝐵
∆𝑞𝐴
⁄ = (𝜀𝐵𝐴𝑞𝐵)/(−𝜀𝐴𝑞𝐴) 
This can be interpreted as the ratio of the cross-price over the own-price elasticity, multiplied by the demand ratio of A 
and B. 
15 Following the example of Allenby and Rossi (1991), the retailer who seeks to apply this method to solve his pricing 
problem will have access to accurate cost data.  
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 ∆𝜋 = ∑ (𝜋𝑗(𝒑
𝟏) − 𝜋𝑗(𝒑
𝟎)) + ∑ (𝜋𝑗′(𝒑
𝟏) − 𝜋𝑗′(𝒑
𝟎))𝑗′𝜖𝛿1𝑗𝜖𝛿1  (8) 
                                                           Change in profit                          Change in profit 
                                                                      affected products                       remaining products 
 
         = ∑ [(𝑝𝑗
1 − 𝑐𝑗)𝑠𝑗(𝒑
𝟏) − (𝑝𝑗
0 − 𝑐𝑗)𝑠𝑗(𝑝
0)]
𝑗∈𝛿1
+ ∑ [(𝑝𝑗′
1 − 𝑐𝑗′) 𝑠𝑗′(𝒑
𝟏) − (𝑝𝑗′
0 − 𝑐𝑗′)𝑠𝑗′(𝒑
𝟎)]
𝑗′𝜖𝛿1
 
(9) 
 where    𝑠𝑗(𝑝) = ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗(𝑝)𝑖  and 𝑠𝑗′(𝑝) = ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗′(𝑝)𝑖  (10) 
This can be written as: 
 ∆𝜋 = ∑ [(𝑝𝑗
1 − 𝑝𝑗
0)𝑠𝑗(𝒑
𝟏) + 𝑚𝑗
0𝑝𝑗
0 (𝑠𝑗(𝒑
𝟏) − 𝑠𝑗(𝒑
𝟎))]𝑗𝜖𝛿1  
                        direct price effect              reduced sales effect 
                                                               for affected alternatives 
 
(11) 
 + ∑ 𝑚𝑗′
0 𝑝𝑗′
0 (𝑠𝑗′(𝒑
𝟏) − 𝑠𝑗′(𝒑
𝟎))
𝑗′𝜖𝛿1
 
                                                                       increased sales effects  
                                                                    for remaining alternatives 
 
 
 
where  𝑚𝑗
0 =
𝑝𝑗
0−𝑐𝑗
𝑝𝑗
0   and  𝑚𝑗′
0 =
𝑝
𝑗′
0−𝑐
𝑗′
𝑝
𝑗′
0    (12) 
According to equation 11, the profit effect of a price increase or an entire delisting consists of 
three terms. The first term captures the direct profit effect from the price increase on the category 
profit. This term will be zero under an entire elimination of the group (since then 𝒑𝟏 is sufficiently 
large so that 𝑠𝑗(𝒑
𝟏) = 0). The second term captures the negative effect on category profits from the 
reduced sales of the products in group 𝛿1. Finally, the last term captures the substitution effect, i.e. 
the positive effect on profits from the increased sales of the other alternatives. 
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The above discussion considered the profit impact of a price increase or delisting, holding the 
rival prices fixed. In practice, one can also consider the profit impact when the rivals respond. As a 
robustness analysis, we consider counterfactuals where rivals respond by half of the initiated price 
increase. This avoids a full equilibrium analysis, which would in any case have to rely on various 
assumptions such as the complicated manufacturer-retailer relationship. 
2.4 Empirical Results  
Parameter Estimates 
The parameter estimates of our two demand models are presented in Table 2-7 and Table 2-8. 
The negative price coefficient (Asda: -0.982; p<.01; Sainsbury’s: -1.081; p<.01)16, indicates that 
households are overall price sensitive. Still, there is sufficient heterogeneity both observed, as 
illustrated by the significant interactions with the household characteristics, and unobserved (Asda: 
SD=0.614; p<.01; Sainsbury’s: SD=0.534; p<.01), as has also been reported in previous literature 
(Meza and Sudhir 2010). Also, consumer heterogeneity regarding the valuation of the inside goods 
relative to the outside good is observed (Asda: SD=3.024; p<.01; Sainsbury’s: SD=2.888; p<.01). On 
average, the significant random coefficient for the outside good dummy variable indicates that 
substitution between inside goods (current retailer's offerings) is stronger than substitution towards 
                                                 
16Although we include a full set of brand variant fixed effects, price (𝑝𝑗𝑡) might be correlated with unobserved changes in 
brand variant characteristics. To assess this possible endogeneity, we adopt the control function approach (Petrin and 
Train 2010). We use two sets of instruments: (i) weekly commodity price indexes for the main ingredients of RTE cereal, 
namely wheat, barley, oat and sugar, collected by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs U.K.  
interacted with brand variant dummies, as each brand variant has a different composition of main ingredients and (ii) the 
price of the same brand variant at the focal retailer in the previous week (𝑝𝑗𝑡−1) (see Villas-Boas and Winer 1999 for a 
conceptually similar practice). All auxiliary regressions showed acceptable levels for R² (>95%). For both retailers, we 
find that the parameter estimates, and in particular the price coefficient, remain very similar after accounting for the 
correction term for both sets of instruments. This suggests that our specification already accounts well for unobserved 
brand variant characteristics and the role of time-varying unobservables is limited. 
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the outside good (other retailers' offerings) (Asda: 7.479; p<.01; Sainsbury’s: 7.513; p<.01). 
Furthermore, the more SKUs a retailer offers within a brand variant, the more likely households are 
to choose the brand variant (Asda: 0.062; p<.01; Sainsbury’s: 0.085; p<.01) (see Tan and Cadeaux 
2011 for similar insights). Similarly, the significant positive brand-variant loyalty coefficient (Asda: 
11.650; p<.01; Sainsbury’s: 11.930; p<.01) reveals that due to state dependence, a brand variant has 
a higher probability of being purchased if a brand variant has been bought on previous purchase 
occasions, supporting prior work (Pauwels et al. 2002 and Geyskens et al. 2010).  
With regard to the brand type*quality tier dummies (relative to outside good option) interacted 
with the household characteristics, substantial heterogeneity across households is observed. For 
instance, households that belong to a low social class (Asda: 0.538; p<.01; Sainsbury’s: 0.973; p<.01) 
and households that spend a larger portion of their cereal budget at the retailer are more likely to 
purchase economy PL options (Asda: 4.333; p<.01; Sainsbury’s: 3.015; p<.01). Standard PLs are less 
appealing for households with children (Asda: -0.362; p<.01; Sainsbury’s: -0.268; p<.01), and 
households’ probability of choosing standard PLs increases if their spending portion of their budget 
at the retailer increases (Asda: 4.526; p<.01; Sainsbury’s: 3.652; p<.01). Although Geyskens et al. 
(2010) find that the premium PL appeal is not related to household socio-demographics, we find that 
premium PLs are less appreciated by households with children (Asda: -0.627; p<.01; Sainsbury’s: -
0.466; p<.01) and are bought by more loyal households (Asda: 3.872; p<0.01; Sainsbury’s: 3.445; 
p<0.01). 
With regard to the line dummies (i.e. kids, muesli and health) interacted with household 
characteristics, again significant observed heterogeneity is observed. Among others, the number of 
children has a negative effect on the probability of choosing health (Asda: -0.206; p<.01; Sainsbury’s: 
-0.220; p<.01 and muesli lines (Asda: -0.157; p<.01; Sainsbury’s: -0.137; p<.01), but the opposite 
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effect for kids alternatives (Asda: 0.278; p<.01; Sainsbury’s: 0.327; p<.01) which is in line with Nevo 
(2001). Furthermore, households that belong to low class tend to be less likely to buy healthy 
alternatives (Asda: -0.127; p<.01; Sainsbury’s: -0.128; p<.01). In contrast, low class households are 
more likely to choose kids brand variants (Asda: 0.340; p<.01; Sainsbury’s: 0.129; p<.05). Similarly, 
household who are more frequently buying cereals at the specific retailer tend to be less likely to 
purchase healthy (Asda: -0.027; p<.01; Sainsbury’s: -0.015; p<.05) cereals. Also, the probability of 
choosing healthy cereals decreases as households’ share of wallet increases for Sainsbury’s -0.177; 
p<.01). However, we find that healthy alternatives in Asda are more appreciated if the households’ 
become more loyal to Asda (Asda: 0.274; p<.01).  
In sum, these findings indicate the importance of accounting for both observed and unobserved 
consumer heterogeneity, in particular regarding the valuation of the price and importance of including 
both line and brand type*tier dummies. Accounting for this type of heterogeneity results in more 
flexible substitution patterns and a first indication that substitution is also driven by quality tier, brand 
types and attributes. We will explore this in much more detail in our counterfactuals in the next 
subsection. 
2.5 What-if scenarios  
Elimination/introduction of a line within a PL Tier 
Here, we explore the demand and profit implications of adding or dropping (i) a kids line, (ii) a health 
line; and (iii) a muesli line for each PL tier. To disentangle who wins or loses, we compare the inside 
diversion ratios derived from our rich model with observed and unobserved household heterogeneity 
with the “fair share” derived from a simplified model without any household heterogeneity 
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(benchmark setting) (see Table 2-9 in Appendix). The fair share or benchmark share therefore 
captures the expected changes in market share if the demand of the removed (introduced) PL line 
variant shifts proportionally to (from) each incumbent. A diversion ratio relative higher (lower) than 
the fair share indicates that the tier/line/brand variant wins relatively more (less) demand17. 
Kids line. First, when the kids PL line from the standard PL tier is eliminated (see Table 2-9 
in Appendix), its share is mainly absorbed by the outside good (Asda: 24.30%; Sainsbury’s: 26.2%), 
followed closely by standard PL non-kids (Asda: 18.33; Sainsbury’s: 18.70%) and mainstream NB 
non-kids (Asda: 18.8%; Sainsbury’s: 21.8%) options. However, a comparison with the benchmark 
setting shows that all remaining kids options benefit from this elimination. For instance, Table 2-2 
shows that mainstream NB and premium NB kids options gain more than the fair share. Still, non-kid 
options within the same quality tier at Sainsbury’s (i.e. standard PL tier and mainstream NB) and the 
same brand type and quality tier at Asda (i.e. standard PL tier) gain more than their fair share. These 
demand switches result in a profit decrease for the retailer of 1.9% in Sainsbury’s and even 11.4% in 
Asda (who offers a broader kids assortment under the standard PL tier).  
We are unable to quantify the impact of eliminating the kids PL line in the other two tiers 
(economy and premium PL), since both options are not offered by Asda and Sainsbury’s during our 
observation period. As such, we consider the effect of hypothetically including the kids PL line in 
these tiers. For the economy PL tier, benchmark setting comparisons reveal that the introduction of 
economy kids alternative in Sainsbury’s strongly hurts retailer’s incumbent kids offerings (all with a 
higher margin), irrespective of the brand-quality type, resulting in a profit decrease -0.05%. However, 
in Asda, this introduction mainly hurts standard PL kids options and results in a profit decrease -
                                                 
17 For the clarification, we only report the detailed kids line results for one retailer (Asda) in the Appendix. Detailed results 
tables for the health and muesli lines are available on request. 
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0.23%. Moreover, the introduction of the kids line in the premium PL tier leads to an overall profit 
decrease -0.07% in Sainsbury’s but profit increase 0.04% in Asda. In Sainsbury’s, introduction of 
premium kids line hurts standard PLs, but also high margin mainstream, premium NB kids and 
mainstream NB regular options because of their greater drawing power (Sethuraman 1995). However, 
in Asda, this introduction only hurts standard PL regular options.  
Table 2-2: Overview of kids delisting/introduction 
Economy PL Standard PL Premium PL Mainstream NB Premium NB Profit  
Kids Regular Kids Regular Kids Regular Kids Regular Kids Regular  
Sainsbury's          
Introduce (=) (- -) (=) N.A. (=) (-) (=) (-) (=) -0.05% 
N.A. (=) Drop (=) N.A. (=) (++) (++) (++) (=) -1.9% 
N.A. (=) (- -) (=) Introduce (=) (- -) (- -) (- -) (=) -0.07% 
           
Asda           
Introduce (=) (- -) (- -) N.A. (=) (=) (=) (=) (=) -0.23% 
N.A. (=) Drop (++) N.A. (=) (++) (=) (++) (=) -11.4% 
N.A. (=) (=) (- -) Introduce (=) (=) (=) (=) (=) +0.04% 
Notes: N.A. = not available at the retailer; (=): (diversion ratio – fair share) <0.5; (+) : 0.5 < (diversion ratio – fair 
share) <1; (++) = (diversion ratio – fair share) >1 ; + and - : net profit respectively increases or decreases due to the 
elimination/introduction. 
 
Healthy line. When standard PL healthy brand variants are eliminated at Sainsbury’s, the lost 
share is mainly captured the outside good (36.39%), followed by brands from the standard non-health 
(16.20%), premium NB non-health (14.06%) and mainstream NB non-health categories (11.37%). 
Similar patterns are observed for Asda, except that the outside good is the least attractive option 
(15.22% compared to 36.39%). This implies that the healthy standard PL at Sainsbury’s is able to 
attract considerably more cereal sales from competing retailers. Within the retailer, a comparison with 
the benchmark setting shows that the standard PL healthy line cannibalizes its own regular options 
and, in the case of Sainsbury’s (Asda) steal share from the mainstream NB healthy (premium NB 
regular) options (see Table 2-3). As a result, the elimination of a healthy standard PLs leads to a 
category profit decrease of 2.60% in Sainsbury’s and 0.09% in Asda.  
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When the retailer's premium PL healthy line is eliminated (Table 2-3), we see that the standard 
non-healthy options and mainstream NB healthy options again gain more than in the proportional 
benchmark setting in Sainsbury’s and only standard regular options gain more than fair shares in 
Asda. Overall, adopting a healthy line under premium PL tier leads to a category profit increase of 
2.84% in Sainsbury’s and 0.04% in Asda.  
Table 2-3 Overview of health delisting/introduction 
Economy PL Standard PL Premium PL Mainstream NB Premium NB Profit  
Health Regular Health Regular Health Regular Health Regular Health Regular  
Sainsbury's          
Introduce (=) (=) (- -) (=) (=) (=) (-) (=) (=) -0.04% 
N.A. (=) Drop (++) (=) (=) (+) (=) (=) (=) -2.60% 
N.A. (=) (=) (++) Drop (=) (++) (=) (=) (=) -2.84% 
           
Asda           
Introduce (=) (=) (- -) (=) (=) (=) (=) (=) (=) -0.07% 
N.A. (=) Drop (++) (=) (=) (=) (=) (=) (+) -0.09% 
N.A. (=) (=) (++) Drop (=) (=) (=) (=) (=) -0.04% 
Notes: N.A. = not available at the retailer; (=): (diversion ratio – fair share) <0.5; (+) : 0.5 < (diversion ratio – fair 
share) <1; (++) = (diversion ratio – fair share) >1 ; + and - : net profit respectively increases or decreases due to the 
elimination/introduction. 
 
If we hypothetically introduce an economy health PL alternative, this introduction mainly 
hurts standard PL regular options in both retailers, and mainstream NB regular options in a small 
extent in Sainsbury’s. This results in a category profit decrease of 0.04%. and 0.07% in Sainsbury’s 
and Asda.   
Muesli line. When the muesli line is dropped from the economy PL tier, a comparison of 
diversion ratios with benchmark setting shows that consumers substitute to closest tier’s muesli 
alternatives which is standard PL muesli line. We also find that non-muesli standard PL alternatives 
gain more than their proportional or fair share in Sainsbury’s (see Table 2-4). This can be expected 
given their strong low-price focus. Although the muesli line under the economy PL tier is able to 
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attract considerable consumer demand from competing retailers, offering muesli line under economy 
PL still leads to a category profit decrease of 0.5% in both retailers.  
Table 2-4 Overview of muesli delisting/introduction 
Economy PL Standard PL Premium PL Mainstream NB Premium NB Profit  
Muesli Regular Muesli Regular Muesli Regular Muesli Regular Muesli Regular  
Sainsbury's          
Drop (=) (+) (+) (=) (=) (=) (=) N.A. (=) +0.5% 
(=) (=) Drop (+) (++) (=) (+) (=) N.A. (=) -0.3% 
(=) (=) (+) (+) Drop (=) (+) (=) N.A. (=) -0.4% 
           
Asda           
Drop (=) (++) (=) (=) (=) (=) (=) N.A. (=) +0.5% 
(=) (=) Drop (+) (=) (=) (=) (=) N.A. (+) +0.08% 
(=) (=) (+) (=) Drop (=) (=) (=) N.A. (=) -0.02% 
Notes: N.A. = not available at the retailer; (=): (diversion ratio – fair share) <0.5; (+) : 0.5 < (diversion ratio – fair 
share) <1; (++) = (diversion ratio – fair share) >1 ; + and - : net profit respectively increases or decreases due to the  
elimination/introduction. 
 
Similarly, when standard PL tier muesli alternatives are delisted from the assortment (see 
Table 2-4), benchmark comparisons reveal that consumers mainly switch to the closest tiers' with 
muesli alternatives, which are premium PL and mainstream NB in Sainsbury’s. However, some 
consumers prefer to stay in the standard PL tier and switch to standard regular options both in Asda 
and Sainsbury’s. Overall, adopting a muesli line under a standard PL tier leads to a category profit 
increase of 0.3% in Sainsbury’s and profit decrease 0.08% in Asda.   
Moreover, when the muesli line is dropped from the premium PL tier (see Table 2-4), 
consumers again mainly switch to closest tiers muesli alternatives, which are standard PL and 
mainstream NB. However, standard PL non-muesli options also gain some share in Sainsbury’s. In 
total, irrespective of the cannibalization with the standard PL tier, the higher margin premium PL 
labels results again in a profit increase of 0.02% in Asda and 0.4% in Sainsbury’s.  
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We can summarize the line extension based findings as follows: When a kids line is 
eliminated/introduced in any PL tier, consumer show overall a more or less loyal pattern to the 
attribute itself and switch to available incumbent kids options irrespective of the brand type (PL vs. 
NB). In contrast, for the health attribute, the dominant behaviour is to switch to regular options of 
standard PL since it is the closest tier in brand-quality type dimension or mainstream NB healthy 
options. And lastly, for the muesli attribute, the dominant behaviour is to switch to standard PLs 
regardless of the presence of the attribute. Only at Sainsbury’s, where between PL tier is less strong, 
consumers also switch to other available incumbent muesli options. In addition to this, we see that 
line extensions can be a win-win outcome for retailers since they lead higher profits despite 
cannibalization of incumbent sales. This mitigates the concern of Quelch and Kenny (1994) about 
cannibalization being a serious problem with line extensions (Kadiyali et al. 1998).  
Price changes 
Lastly, we consider the effect of adjustments in the price of PLs for each PL tier. As NBs are, in 
general, higher priced than PLs, the NB-PL price differential [p(NB)-p(PL)] is positive (Sethuraman 
and Gielens 2014). In this respect, Hoch and Lodish (2001) advise retailers to maintain a large price 
gap between PLs (aggregated across tiers) and NBs as it leads to higher PL share by weaning 
consumers away from NBs. Pauwels and Srinivasan (2004) obtain similar findings, where they 
specifically focus on the standard PL tier. In contrast, if one focuses on profitability rather than sales 
or share, a large price gap between PLs and NBs is not necessarily desirable (Sethuraman and Raju 
2012). In fact, if retailers close the objective and perceived quality gap between PLs and NBs, they 
can gain higher profits by also reducing the price gap (Raju, Sethuraman, and Dhar 1995; Sayman, 
Hoch, and Raju 2002). Moreover, Sethuraman and Raju (2012) state in a recent review paper that 
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given the profitable outcomes of increasing the price of PLs, ‘the price differential can be reduced to 
near zero?’. However, the price differential (NB vs. PL) cannot be too low or zero, as consumers still 
are willing to pay a premium for NB image, even if they perceive the PL to be equivalent (Sethuraman 
2003; Applebaum, Gerstner and Naik 2003).  
Table 2-5 The impact of alternative price changes on net profit 
 
In what follows, we explore the impact of decreasing the gap between standard PLs and 
mainstream NBs by increasing the price of standard PLs by 10% and 20%. These price increases 
result in a demand drop for standard PLs, mainly in favor of mainstream and premium NBs, and the 
outside good. However, these price increases lead overall to a net category profit increase for both 
retailers. For instance, for Sainsbury’s we observe a category profit increase of 7.2% and 13.1% and 
8.5% and 15.1% for Asda (see Table 2-5). Hence, both retailers and NB manufacturers gain from this 
standard PL price increase, as it leads to a demand shift to NBs accompanied by a profit lift for the 
retailer.  
Furthermore, Sethuraman and Gielens (2014) state that little is known about how premium 
PLs should be priced. Retailers are generally advised to set prices of their premium PLs slightly above 
Scenario’s price increase by   % 
Sainsbury’s Asda 
Profit  Profit 
Below Standard PL Economy PL 10% 0.60% 1.00% 
30% 1.50% 2.70% 
50% 2.30% 3.90% 
Below Premium PL Standard PL 10% 7.20% 8.50% 
20% 13.10% 15.10% 
Below Mainstream NB Premium PL 10% 2.10% 0.00% 
28% N.A. 0.10% 
Equal to Mainstream NB Premium PL 13% 2.40% N.A. 
43% N.A. 0.20% 
Above Mainstream NB Premium PL 20% 3.30% N.A. 
50% N.A. 0.20% 
Equal to Premium NB Premium PL 27% 4.10% N.A. 
Notes: N.A. = not applicable scenarios for the retailer. % price increases are determined by taking into account certain 
price thresholds. For example, 10%, 30% and 50% price increase scenarios still make the economy PL cheaper than 
standard PL. 
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NBs prices (Kumar and Steenkamp 2007) or at parity (Millward Brown 2008). Items in the top tier 
of a supermarket’s sub-brands are sometimes more expensive than the market leaders (World 
Trademark Review 2012). In our case, both retailers price their premium PLs below the NBs. As such, 
we conduct an experiment by increasing the price of premium PLs in order to decrease the price 
differential between premium PLs and NBs. Accordingly, we explore the following four scenarios: 
(i) Premium PL price + 10% (ii) Premium PL price equal to Mainstream NB price (i.e. + 13% for 
Sainsbury’s and +43% for Asda) (iii) Premium PL price above Mainstream NB price (i.e. +20% for 
Sainsbury’s and + 50% for Asda) and (iv) Premium PL price equal to Premium NB price (i.e. + 27% 
for Sainsbury’s)18 (see Table 2-5). Although the price increase of premium PLs results in a demand 
loss for itself, it is mainly in favour of standard PL and mainstream NBs and premium NBs. Note that 
the premium PL changes at Asda are very minor, which is due to the very small number of SKU’s 
(i.e. 3). Our results suggest that a retailer should price its premium PLs above the mainstream and 
even equal to premium NBs in order to improve its net category profits. 
The above discussion considered the profit impact of a price increase or delisting, holding the 
rival prices fixed. In practice, one can also consider the profit impact when the rivals respond. As a 
robustness analysis, we consider counterfactuals where rivals respond by half of the initiated price 
increase. For example, if the original initiated scenario is increasing the price of economy PLs by 
10%, we also increase the price of all rivals (standard PL, premium PLs, mainstream and premium 
NBs) by 5%. A similar robustness analysis is done for all scenarios and group of brands. The results 
show that if competitors react by also increasing their prices, the retailer is better off by earning even 
more profits (see Table 2-10 in Appendix). 
                                                 
18 At Asda, mainstream NBs are, on average, priced above premium NBs (i.e. 3.63 vs. 3.45), so we dropped scenario 4 
for Asda. 
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In addition, we explore the extreme case where PL tier price is increased to infinity which 
equals to an elimination of the entire assortment flagged under a PL tier to identify who competes 
with whom (see Table 2-6). In line with Geyskens et al. (2010), the retailer's standard PL offerings 
benefit proportionately more from dropping the economy PL tier. Economy PL brand variants 
therefore clearly cannibalize the standard PL brand variants. Or in other words, providing an economy 
PL tier shifts consumer demand from the standard PL tier (and to a much smaller extent of premium 
PL tier in the case of Asda) to the economy alternatives. Still, the economy PL tier is able to attract 
considerable consumer demand from competing retailers, probably the hard discounters like Aldi & 
Lidl (see Vroegrijk et al. 2013). However, in total, deleting the economy PLs leads to a category profit 
increase of 1.9% for Sainsbury’s and even 2.8% for Asda. Similarly, when standard PLs are 
eliminated from the retailer’s assortment, the retailer's premium PLs and mainstream NB (and to a 
smaller extent premium NB in the case of Asda) offerings benefit comparatively more from this 
elimination by attracting more than their benchmark share or fair share. Standard PL alternatives 
mainly compete with the mainstream NBs (same quality tier but different brand type) and premium 
PLs (higher quality tier but same brand type). This first indicates that standard PLs are doing what 
they are designed for, competing with the mainstream NBs (see Kumar and Steenkamp 2007), but at 
the small cost that part of the standard PL demand comes from the (higher margin) premium PL 
alternatives. In line with the economy PL tier, the standard PL tier considerably attracts demand from 
competing retailers. Overall, adopting a standard PL tier leads to a category profit increase of 11.9% 
for Sainsbury’s and 18.3% for Asda. Finally, when retailer’s premium PL options are eliminated, the 
economy PL option is clearly unattractive for premium PL buyers, whereas the standard PL tier and 
mainstream and premium NBs gain share. This indicates that premium PLs are cannibalizing the 
standard PL sales (partly supporting the findings of Geyskens et al. 2010), but not the economy PL 
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sales. In this respect, Szymanowski and Gijsbrechts (2012) state that quality variation induced by the 
higher quality PL lines may dilute the signalling value of the standard PL brand. With regard to the 
economy tier, Palmeira and Thomas (2011) show that the quality perception of a value store brand 
(like the economy PL) are not affected by the presence of a premium store brand, which is supported 
by our findings. Irrespective of the cannibalization with the standard PL tier, the higher margin of 
premium PLs results in a profit increase of 3.3% for Sainsbury’s and 0.1% for Asda.  
Table 2-6 Who competes with whom? 
Economy Standard  Premium  Mainstream  Premium  
Profit 
 PLs PLs PLs NBs NBs 
Sainsbury's 
Infinite price 
increase 
(++) = = = 1.90% 
= 
Infinite price 
increase 
= (++) = -11.90% 
= (++) 
Infinite price 
increase 
= = -3.30% 
      
Asda      
Economy Standard  Premium  Mainstream  Premium  
Profit 
 PLs PLs PLs NBs NBs 
Infinite price 
increase 
(++) = = = 2.80% 
= 
Infinite price 
increase 
= (++) = -18.30% 
= (++) 
Infinite price 
increase 
= = -0.10% 
Notes: N.A. = not available at the retailer; (=): (diversion ratio – fair share) <0.5;  (+) : 0.5 < (diversion ratio – fair 
share) <1; (++) = (diversion ratio – fair share) >1 ; + and - : net profit respectively increases or decreases due to the 
elimination/introduction. 
 
Consistent with Sethuraman and Raju (2012) and ter Braak et al. (2013), who refer to premium 
PLs as the high-margin tier, our results also show that the presence of a premium PL tier contributes 
positively to the retailer’s profitability. In the case of Asda, the impact of elimination of the premium 
PL tier is minor, which is due to the very low number of premium PL SKU’s currently offered at the 
retailer. In sum, economy buyers switch mainly to the retailer's standard PL options, whereas standard 
and premium PL buyers mainly switch to each other as well as NB options. Overall, adopting an 
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economy PL tier leads to a category profit decrease, however standard and premium PLs positively 
affects category profits. 
Lastly, given that providing economy tier in the assortment does not generate additional profit 
in all levels (whole tier, line or brand variant), we experiment with the prices of the economy tier by 
increasing the price 10%, 30% and 50% to check whether without dropping the tier, any increase in 
the prices result in a profitable way (see Table 2-5). Our results also show that although the price 
increase of economy PLs results in a demand loss for itself mainly in favor of standard PL, mainstream 
and premium However, in total economy PL’s price increase leads to a category profit increase of 
0.6%, 1.5% and 2.3% for Sainsbury’s and 1%, 2.7% and 3.9% for Asda respectively.  
In brief, these price counterfactuals display that a PL price increase, irrespective of the tier, 
results in a further improvement of a retailer’s category profits accompanied with an increased 
demand for the NB alternatives.  
Differences between retailers 
The above findings reveal some interesting differences between our two focal retailers, Sainsbury’s 
and Asda. Overall, in the different scenarios, the competition between the different PL tiers and lines 
turns out to be stronger at Asda relative to Sainsbury’s. This might be driven by the fact that the price 
gap between the three PL tiers is much smaller at Asda than at Sainsbury’s. As indicated by 
Sethuraman (1995), cross-competitive effects are stronger when the price gap between two brands is 
smaller because the two brands will be more likely to enter a consumer’s consideration set (see also 
Gielens 2012 for a similar reasoning in a new product introduction setting).  
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2.6 Discussion 
Worldwide, more and more retailers are carrying multiple PL tiers within a category. In fact, the 
importance (and number) of economy and premium PLs, next to the standard PLs, has increased as 
has a range of PL lines focusing on healthy eating, kids and organic foods (Planet Retail 2013). 
However, what are the implications of this ongoing PL proliferation into tiers and lines on competition 
between both PL and NB brand variants in a retailer’s assortment, and subsequently on retailer’s 
profits?  
If we first explore the overall competition between PL tiers (irrespective of PL lines within a 
tier), our findings indicate that economy and premium PL tiers mainly cannibalize the standard PLs, 
which confirms prior insights (Geyskens et al. 2010). On top of this, our study reveals that standard 
PLs partly cannibalize premium PLs. Despite the cannibalization between PLs, all PL tiers are able 
to attract sales from competing retailers, and, except for the economy PLs, to ameliorate category 
profitability. Still, contrary to standard and premium PLs, the acquired low-priced economy PL sales, 
coming not only from competing retailers but form other (higher-priced) alternatives at the focal 
retailer, result in a less profitable situation. On top, our price simulation reveal that retailers can 
strengthen their category profitability by closing the price gap between their PL offerings and the NB 
alternatives. This strategy comes at a cost of losing PL sales but boosts more profitable NB sales. 
Interestingly, a retailer can uplift the profit generated by its economy tier by upgrading its price. 
Likewise, a retailer can further improve its profits by increasing the prices of its standard PL products, 
despite the switch of some of their standard PL buyers to mainstream and premium NBs. Similar, a 
price increase for the premium PL brand variants improves profits.  
Overall, very similar patterns are observed with regard to PL line extensions and deletions 
within a PL tier. All line extensions (i.e. kids, muesli and health) in the premium PL tier cannibalize 
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standard PLs (but not the economy PLs) but, in contrary to the tier level, to also steal business from 
the mainstream and premium NBs with the same attribute (i.e. kids, muesli and health), resulting in a 
profitable outcome. Most standard PL line extensions (i.e. kids, muesli and health) again steal demand 
from own premium PLs (not economy PLs) but also from mainstream NBs and improve retailer’s 
profitability. Only for the economy PLs, our findings indicate that at all levels (i.e. whole tier, line 
and brand variant) retailers do not earn additional profits with their low-priced offerings, questioning 
their excessively large assortment. However, for retailers pursuing objectives other than profit 
maximization, like generating store traffic or competing with hard discounters (see Vroegrijk et al. 
2013), an appropriate strategy would be to simply reduce this tier's assortment, instead of dropping it 
altogether.  
These findings are consistent with recent business practices. More and more retailers are (i) 
further proliferating their standard and premium PL assortment, and (ii) boosting the price of their 
economy PL alternatives. Firstly, U.S.’s third largest food retailing company Supervalu expanded its 
PL business in 2012 with another 1,500 new products of medium and premium quality, including a 
line of natural and organic foods called Wild Harvest (Market Watch 2012). Likewise, U.S. retailer 
Kroger has expanded its organic and healthy (standard and premium) PL lines recently (Market Watch 
2012). According to a report of Food Product Design (2015), there is opportunity to increase category 
participation by introducing more premium product lines featuring organic, healthy products (Food 
Product Design 2015). This reasoning is supported by our findings that indicate that introducing a 
healthy line under the premium tier umbrella attracts considerable amount of share from competing 
retailers. 
Secondly, there is an ongoing discussion in the grocery retailing whether introducing economy 
PLs is really a right strategy to fight with discounters and in the end the net effect of this strategy for 
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the retailer is a big question mark in terms of profitability. Koen de Jong who is Managing Partner, 
International Private Label Consult (IPLC) claim that “many mainstream retailers have expanded or 
re-launched their economy PL lines to mitigate the risk of losing shoppers to discounters. However, 
we believe that negative effects may result from this strategy. Economy PLs generate lower margins 
to retailers than NB equivalent PLs. As a result, offering economy PLs may lead to an erosion of 
category profitability due to cannibalizing effects”. Indeed, the top grocery retailers in UK (i.e Tesco, 
Sainsbury’s and Asda) have increased the price of more than 40 per cent on average of their economy 
PLs in the previous years given that rising commodity costs and food inflation put pressure on the 
profitability of the bottom line (Daily Mail 2013). Both Tesco and Sainsbury’s indicate that despite 
price rises, their economy ranges are as popular as ever (Daily Mail 2012).  
Limitations and Further Research 
Our research has several limitations that offer interesting avenues for future research. First of all, our 
analysis focuses only on one FMCG category and two (leading) retailers, which prevents us to 
generalize our findings. Future research should study NB-PL competition across a large set of product 
categories but also within a large set of retailers, in order to generalize our findings, but especially to 
study moderating retailer and category effects. In this respect, ter Braak et al. (2014) already reveal 
that retailers introduce premium PLs in some categories but not in others. 
Second, although the inclusion of the outside good in our model allows for flexible substitution 
towards other retailers’ offerings, further insights are needed into which retailers attract these lost 
sales. For the economy PLs case, one can expect that consumer switch to offerings of hard discounters 
(like Aldi & Lidl) and maybe economy PL offerings of competing traditional retailers as economy 
PLs are strategically introduced to fight with these alternatives (Dekimpe et al. 2011 and Vroegrijk et 
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al. 2013). Likewise, with regard to for the standard and premium PLs, consumers might switch to 
traditional retailers’ NBs, but also their standard and premium PL offerings. Hence, further research 
is called for the study this inter- and intra-tier completion not only within a retailer but across retailers, 
helping retailers in further mapping out their own PL strategy. 
Third, in our counterfactual analysis, we held the prices of the rival alternatives at the retailer 
constant. In our sensitivity analysis, we already considered partial rival price responses to a price 
increase for a PL alternative, and we find even stronger profit effects. In reality, the prices of 
competing offerings might also increase as a reaction to an entirely new tier/line/brand variant 
delisting (and vice versa for the introduction of a new PL alternative). Future research should further 
study the net result of these simultaneous actions.  
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Table 2-7 Sainsbury’s Estimation Results 
    Interactions with household characteristics  
Variables Mean Std. dev  # of children Low class Middle class Buying 
Frequency 
SoW 
 
Price -1.081*** 0.534***  0.0552*** -0.159*** -0.113*** -0.00273 0.197***  
 (0.0424) (0.0109)  (0.0140) (0.0386) (0.0311) (0.00459) (0.0358)  
Outside Good 7.513*** 2.888***        
 (0.161) (0.0642)        
Assortment 0.0854***         
 (0.0103)         
Loyalty 11.93***         
 (0.0583)         
Lines          
Kids    0.327*** 0.129** 0.0943** -0.0514*** 0.0354  
    (0.0146) (0.0505) (0.0398) (0.00885) (0.0648)  
Health    -0.220*** -0.128*** 0.0139 -0.0155** -0.177***  
    (0.0161) (0.0455) (0.0349) (0.00780) (0.0586)  
Muesli    -0.137*** -0.317*** -0.0865 0.00788 0.474***  
    (0.0294) (0.0804) (0.0589) (0.0128) (0.103)  
Brand type vs. quality tiers           
Economy PL    -0.294*** 0.973*** 0.237 0.126*** 3.015***  
    (0.0876) (0.214) (0.145) (0.0198) (0.150)  
Standard PL    -0.268*** 0.528*** 0.0521 0.0306* 3.652***  
    (0.0772) (0.193) (0.126) (0.0166) (0.116)  
Premium PL    -0.466*** 0.525** 0.134 0.0332 3.445***  
    (0.0863) (0.219) (0.149) (0.0240) (0.179)  
Mainstream NB    -0.175** 0.539*** 0.0479 0.0542*** 3.323***  
    (0.0792) (0.205) (0.137) (0.0198) (0.148)  
Premium NB    -0.382*** 0.572*** 0.141 0.0413** 3.541***  
    (0.0793) (0.204) (0.137) (0.0200) (0.145)  
Brand Variant Dummies Yes         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1          
Note: The parameter estimates and std. errors (in parentheses) of the mean effects are shown in the first column. Column 2 shows estimates of the random coefficients, while columns 
3-6 show estimates of the household characteristics interacted with price and brand variant characteristics.  
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Table 2-8 Asda Estimation Results 
    Interactions with household characteristics  
Variables Mean Std. dev  # of children Low class Middle class Buying 
Frequency 
SoW 
 
Price -0.982*** 0.614***  0.0990*** -0.00670 0.0518 0.0166*** -0.0716**  
 (0.0409) (0.0107)  (0.00968) (0.0354) (0.0320) (0.00336) (0.0319)  
Outside Good 7.479*** 3.024***        
 (0.153) (0.0487)        
Assortment 0.0626***         
 (0.00928)         
Loyalty 11.65***         
 (0.0492)         
Lines          
Kids    0.278*** 0.340*** 0.147*** 0.00132 0.183***  
    (0.0101) (0.0383) (0.0338) (0.00504) (0.0488)  
Health    -0.206*** -0.127*** -0.186*** -0.0270*** 0.274***  
    (0.0149) (0.0486) (0.0423) (0.00721) (0.0652)  
Muesli    -0.157*** -0.0471 -0.0174 -0.00520 -0.0651  
    (0.0245) (0.0798) (0.0684) (0.0110) (0.101)  
Brand type vs. quality tiers           
Economy PL    -0.247*** 0.538*** 0.445*** 0.0205 4.333***  
    (0.0413) (0.155) (0.139) (0.0133) (0.116)  
Standard PL    -0.362*** 0.107 0.260* 0.00906 4.526***  
    (0.0401) (0.149) (0.133) (0.0121) (0.103)  
Premium PL    -0.627*** -0.0601 0.123 0.0226 3.872***  
    (0.0851) (0.268) (0.226) (0.0320) (0.308)  
Mainstream NB    -0.384*** 0.323** 0.416*** -0.0424*** 4.536***  
    (0.0428) (0.159) (0.142) (0.0142) (0.126)  
Premium NB    -0.514*** 0.242 0.353** -0.0759*** 4.721***  
    (0.0423) (0.157) (0.140) (0.0139) (0.121)  
Brand Variant Dummies Yes         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1          
Note: The parameter estimates and std. errors (in parentheses) of the mean effects are shown in the first column. Column 2 shows estimates of the random coefficients, while columns 
3-6 show estimates of the household characteristics interacted with price and brand variant characteristics. 
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Appendix 
Table 2-9 Introducing/Delisting Kids Lines from the Tiers (Asda) 
  Economy PL Standard PL Premium PL Mainstream NB Premium NB Outside 
Good 
Net 
Profit 
  Kids Non-kids Kids Non-Kids Kids Non-Kids Kids Non-Kids Kids Non-Kids     
Diversion Ratio 
Full Model 
Introduce 4.3% 15.6% 17.0% N.A. 0.3% 4.3% 16.7% 8.2% 17.4% 16.2%  
Inside Good DR 
Full Model 
Introduce 5.1% 18.6% 20.2% N.A. 0.4% 5.2% 19.9% 9.8% 20.8%   
Inside Good DR 
Benchmark 
Introduce 6.6% 17.0% 18.0% N.A. 0.4% 5.2% 21.0% 9.4% 22.5%   
∆ Profit 0.1% 0.0% -0.1% -0.1% N.A. 0.0% 0.0% -0.1% 0.0% -0.1%  -0.23% 
             
Diversion Ratio 
Full Model 
N.A. 4.6% Drop 18.3% N.A. 0.3% 5.8% 18.8% 9.9% 17.9% 24.3%  
Inside Good DR 
Full Model 
N.A. 6.1% Drop 24.2% N.A. 0.5% 7.6% 24.9% 13.1% 23.7%   
Inside Good DR 
Benchmark 
N.A. 7.9% Drop 21.7% N.A. 0.5% 6.2% 25.3% 11.3% 27.1%   
∆ Profit N.A. 0.2% -23.7% 3.1% N.A. 0.1% 1.1% 3.3% 1.7% 2.9%  -11.4% 
             
Diversion Ratio 
Full Model 
N.A. 3.91% 12.90% 15.71% Introduce 0.49% 3.80% 15.49% 6.93% 15.90% 24.87%  
Inside Good DR 
Full Model 
N.A. 5.20% 17.17% 20.92% Introduce 0.65% 5.06% 20.62% 9.22% 21.16%   
Inside Good DR 
Benchmark 
N.A. 6.61% 16.85% 17.91% Introduce 0.47% 5.32% 21.50% 9.26% 22.08%   
∆ Profit N.A. 0.00% -0.01% -0.01% 0.09% 0.00% 0.00% -0.01% 0.00% -0.01%  +0.04% 
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Table 2-10 Sainsbury's and Asda net category profits by including competitors' reactions 
Scenario’s price increase by % Sainsbury’s Asda 
Profit  Profit 
Below Standard PL Economy PL 10% (+) 18% (+) 18% 
30% (+) 52% (+) 51% 
50% (+) 82% (+) 79% 
Below Premium PL Standard PL 10% (+) 22% (+) 22% 
20% (+) 42% (+) 42% 
Below Mainstream NB Premium PL 10% (+) 22% (+) 19% 
28% N.A. (+) 47% 
Equal to Mainstream NB Premium PL 13% (+) 25% N.A. 
43% N.A. (+) 68% 
Above Mainstream NB Premium PL 20% (+) 47% N.A. 
50% N.A. (+) 83% 
Equal to Premium NB Premium PL 27% (+) 51% N.A. 
Note: Sainsbury's and Asda's net category profit changes are calculated by taking into account competitors' price 
response. We assume that competitors also increase their prices by half of the original brand's price change (e.g. 
if price of the economy PL is changed by 10%, competitors react by changing their prices 5%). 
Derivation of choice probabilities 
Assume that household 𝑖 chooses the brand variant 𝑗 that maximizes utility among all the available 
alternatives, conditional on household 𝑖's available choice set. Then the probability that household 
𝑖 chooses brand variant 𝑗 is given by:  
 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗(𝑣𝑖) =
exp (𝛾𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡)
1 + ∑ exp ( 𝛾𝑖𝑘 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑘𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑝𝑘𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡)
𝐽
𝑘=1
 (A1) 
With unobserved heterogeneity, it is necessary to integrate the conditional choice probability 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗 over the unobserved individual term 𝑣𝑖 (containing the unobserved individual-specific 
valuation of price and the outside good, as discussed in the text). Then, we obtain the random 
coefficients logit choice probability: 
 
𝑠𝑖𝑗 = ∫𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗(𝐻𝐻𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟, 𝜐𝑖)
𝜈
𝑑𝐹(𝐻𝐻𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟, 𝜐𝑖) (A2) 
Following Train (2003), to approximate the integral in (A2), we take 𝑅 draws for 𝜐𝑖 from the 
Chapter 2  
56 
 
standard normal distribution to obtain average choice probability for each household: 
 𝑠𝑖𝑗
=
1
𝑅
∑
exp (𝛾𝑗
0 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑗 + 𝜃𝑖𝐼𝑖𝑗 − (𝛼
0 + 𝜎𝜐𝑖
𝑟)𝑝𝑖𝑗 + (𝑃𝐺𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑝, 𝑝𝑖𝑗)Π𝐻𝐻𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖)
1 + ∑ exp ( 𝐽𝑘=1 𝛾𝑘
0 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑘+𝜃𝑖𝐼𝑖𝑘 − (𝛼0 + 𝜎𝜐𝑖
𝑟)𝑝𝑖𝑘 + (𝑃𝐺𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑝, 𝑝𝑖𝑘)Π𝐻𝐻𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖)
𝑅
𝑟=1
 
(A3) 
 
where Π denotes the matrix of parameters capturing the impact of household characteristics on the 
valuation for the product group dummies 𝑃𝐺𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑝  and price  𝑝𝑖𝑗 (as it denotes 𝛾
ℎ𝑝and 𝛼ℎ). 
To estimate the parameters, we use the method of simulated maximum likelihood, where the 
choice probabilities (A3) form the basis for the likelihood function. 
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Chapter 3  The Battle of Traditional Retailers versus Discounters: 
The Role of PL Tiers19 
3.1 Introduction 
The rise of the discounters is a key driver of structural change within the grocery retailing (The 
Independent 2014). Their market shares range from about 10% to an astonishing 43% in Germany 
(Global Retail Mag 2014) and they are estimated to grow by 82.2% between now and 2020, 
according to grocery think-thank IGD (Food Manufacture UK 2015). Their growing popularity is 
not a passing fad or their success is not limited to recession periods. They have become a 
sustainable player of the grocery market (Planet Retail 2014). They compete on price, quality, 
consistency and simplicity. Discounters apply their no-frills approach, products are often displayed 
on the floor on pallets and retail-ready; half-sized pallets are used to further optimize floor space 
(Cleeren et al. 2010; AT Kearney 2011). Their sales rely primarily on private labels (PLs) and, 
recently, they offer a limited number of national brands (NBs). In 27 countries of European Union 
(EU-27), on average, about 80% of discounters’ sales come from PLs (AT Kearney 2011). 
Discounters offer a minimal assortment of around 1,300 to 1,400 products, compared to the 30,000 
you have in a supermarket. Hence, by keeping the number of products to a minimum on PLs, they 
are able to deal with far fewer suppliers and that helps to keep costs down (BBC 2015; IGD 2011). 
Above all, prices are very low. By economizing on assortment and service, discounters are able to 
offer their PL products at rock-bottom prices (Lin et al. 2012).  
                                                 
19 This chapter was written together with my supervisors Frank Verboven and Lien Lamey. It was published in Journal 
of Retailing and Consumer Services 39 (2017): 11-22. 
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Nowadays, over half of UK shoppers, 51%, visit a discount food store each month and in 
the past two years the number of consumers who use discounters for their main weekly shopping 
has more than doubled, from 5% to 12% (ITV News 2014). For the traditional retailers, the gains 
of Aldi and Lidl have been like the arrival of a new predator (BBC 2015). As discount grocery 
retailers increasingly meet the needs of European consumers, traditional retailers are seeing their 
profits plummet and market shares shrink (BCG 2016). When discounters enter a local market, 
traditional retailers are severely affected and incur sales losses of approximately 17% on average 
(Ailawadi et al. 2010; Vroegrijk et al. 2013). However, if they locate close to traditional retailers, 
some loss can be mitigated since becoming part of a twin location with the discounters may turn 
the traditional supermarket into an attractive option for combined visits (Vroegrijk et al. 2013) and 
might result in a or create win-win situation for both traditional retailers and discounters through 
inter store synergy and increased consumers’ spending (Ailawadi et al. 2010; Singh, Hansen, and 
Blattberg 2006). Moreover, discounters not only affect traditional retailers’ market share, they also 
put pressure on them to increase operational efficiency and/or decrease prices (Cleeren et al. 2010; 
van Heerde et al. 2008). Consumers with the lowest willingness to pay for NBs were attracted by 
discounters’ cheap PL products, reducing the customer base of the incumbent retailers (Bergés-
Sennou, Bontems and Réquillart 2004). The boss of UK-based Morrisons has declared that the 
competition from discount grocers Lidl and Aldi have thrown the supermarket industry into its 
biggest crisis since its birth in the 1950s (The Independent 2014).  
To fight back against discounters (but also other retailers), traditional retailers started to 
view their PLs much more strategically and begun to explore new growth opportunities via multi-
tier PL strategies (Food Navigator 2015). This ranges from the typical cheap and low quality own 
labels (i.e., economy PLs) to somewhat less expensive PLs comparable in quality to the national 
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brands (NBs) (i.e., standard PLs), to premium quality and high value added PLs (i.e., premium 
PLs) (Kumar and Steenkamp, 2007). With this strategy, retailers can provide a quality point of 
differentiation compared to their competitors (PLMA 2011). Whereas national brands (NBs) are 
available in all retailers’ assortment and shoppers can find them in any retailer, PLs have restricted 
distribution that is unique to the retailer (Chen, Narasimhan and Dhar 2010). Hence, with 
increasing competition among retailers, PL tiers are now set to become the new battle ground 
(Food Navigator 2015). In fact, an increasing number of retailers is adopting a multi-tier PL 
strategy (Brand Packaging 2014).  
Established retailers typically compete with discounters via entry-price PLs (economy PLs) 
with a pricing strategy of 2% to 16% lower than the prices of discounters (Global Retail Mag 
2014). However, one of the managerially highly relevant questions is whether this is a right 
strategy for the traditional retailers. Managing Director of International PL Consult states that 
“introducing economy PL strategy can backfire since economy PLs generate lower margins than 
standard PLs and most importantly they can cannibalize the current PL offerings” (Global Retail 
Mag 2014). Moreover, a shopper survey conducted by IGD revealed that 27% of UK shoppers 
believe the quality of discounters’ PLs are comparable to standard PLs of the traditional retailers, 
20% said they are very similar to NBs and 7% even think that they are even better than anything 
sold in a traditional supermarket (Just Food 2015). The numbers are impressive and challenge the 
idea that discounters’ PLs are inferior and the real competitor might be standard PLs of traditional 
retailers not economy PLs. Furthermore, some practitioners even advise to adopt a completely 
opposite PL strategy in the discounter battle, i.e., to offer high quality premium PLs with higher 
prices where discounters cannot match the traditional retailers’ quality and experience 
(Supermarket News 2014; Vroegrijk et al. 2016). Therefore, traditional retailers need to emphasize 
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what they offer that discounters can’t (BBC 2015). In sum, the opinions on which PL tier is the 
best strategy in response to such discounters’ threat is diverse and empirical evidence is limited. 
Hence, it is important to shed light on the demand effects of PL tier strategy for the market players. 
This study contributes to the existing PL tiers and retailer (format) competition literature 
in two ways. First, while there have been some studies focusing on inter-tier competition only 
within a retailer (e.g., Geyskens et al. (2010) and Gielens (2012)), we are – to the best of our 
knowledge – the first to investigate the inter-tier competition across retailers by adding the retailer 
dimension in our study. Second, although retailer (format) competition has been widely analyzed 
in the literature (e.g., Gonzales-Benito et al. (2005); Gijsbrechts et al. (2008); Briesch et al. (2009); 
Cleeren et al. (2010); Haucap et al. (2013)), we are the first to systematically investigate the role 
of PL tiers in retailer (format) competition (in the context of traditional versus discount retail 
formats). 
Hence, our work builds on two streams of literature. The first stream focuses on PL tiers, 
but ignores competition across retailers. Within this area, most scholars study the impact of PL tier 
introductions on category sales and incumbents’ market shares within a given retailer. Geyskens 
et al. (2010) show that, based on a brand-choice model with context effects, the introduction of an 
economy PL cannibalizes the incumbent standard PL but benefits the mainstream NBs. Similarly, 
an introduction of a premium PL cannibalizes the incumbent PLs (i.e. budget and standard) and 
sometimes benefits premium-quality NBs. Gielens (2012) studies the impact of PL and NB 
introductions on category sales and the share of the top NBs and the three PL tiers (aggregated 
over brand variants). She finds, among other things, that new products introduced by standard PLs 
and premium PLs are sometimes able to boost category sales, to shrink NB rivals’ shares, and to 
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cannibalize other PL tiers (respectively, economy and premium, and only economy), whereas new 
products introduced under the economy PL flag only stimulates the overall economy PL share.  
The second related literature stream bears on retailer (format) competition, without 
considering the role of PL tiers. Gonzales-Benito et al. (2005) analyze the role of store format in 
retail competitive interactions. They find that there is greater spatial rivalry within store formats 
(intra-format) than between store formats (inter-format). Gijsbrechts et al. (2008) also indirectly 
study the competition between supermarkets by using a spatial interaction model. They examine 
the non-promotional motives for multiple-store shopping by incorporating shopping patterns 
(single-, separate-, or combined-store visits) and related shopping decisions. Their main finding is 
when stores are category-preference complements, such as in the case of a supermarket and a hard 
discounter, a location close to the complementary store may actually have the opposite impact. 
Hence, by facilitating combined-store visits, the location may create an ‘attraction’ effect and even 
provide benefits to chains, allowing them to ‘team up’ against more remote competitors that have 
an appealing offer across the board. Lastly, Cleeren et al. (2010) and Haucap et al. (2013) study 
inter-format retail competition between traditional retailers and discounters. They find that there 
is intense competition within both the traditional and discount format, although the competition 
between traditional retailers is more severe. However, they do not explicitly study the switching 
behavior of consumers among the traditional retailers and discounters and do not identify which 
brands compete with each other across retail formats.  
Although the inter-tier PL and/or NB competition across retailers has recently been 
recognized as being of great managerial interest (BBC 2015; The Guardian 2014), to the best of 
our knowledge it lacks empirical research with two notable exceptions. Dawes and Nenycz-Thiel 
(2013) study the intensity of PL competition across retailers. By using a purchase duplication 
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analysis, they identify which buyers of one brand also appear as buyers of another brand. More 
specifically, they explore whether buying one PL increases the tendency to buy a different retailer's 
PL in the same category. They find that PLs compete against NBs within-retailer, but also compete 
against the PLs of other retailers across retailers. But, they only focus on standard PLs (not taking 
into account the other tiers) and more importantly they don’t include discounters in their study. 
Secondly, Vroegrijk et al. (2016) is the first study to explicitly investigates how economy PLs 
affect the retailer’s category sales before and after hard discounter entry. They find that economy 
PLs are not a good defense tool against hard discounters. However, the important question still 
remains same. If the economy PLs are not an effective tool in this battle, which PL strategy is best 
for traditional retailers? And what could be alternative strategies in terms of pricing or other 
competitive tools (e.g. assortment depth)? Recently, ASDA and Morrisons, the UK's 'Big Four' 
supermarkets with the largest overlap with discounters, have reacted to discounters by announcing 
a round of price cuts for their PLs (Reuters 2014). Alternatively, traditional retailers also offer 
price cuts for their NB offerings instead of decreasing the price of standard PLs. Tesco recently 
announced that they will fight back against the growth of discounters by cutting the price of 
hundreds of branded products including Hovis bread, Kellogg's cornflakes and some other NBs 
(Reuters 2015). In the meantime, discounters not only focus on their PLs but increasingly introduce 
NBs in their assortments. Aldi now announces the introduction of major NBs into their assortment 
(Distrifood 2012). 
The purpose of our study is to shed light on these issues by formally investigating (i) which 
PL tier is the most effective for the traditional retailers in the battle with the discounters; (ii) how 
traditional retailers should adjust the pricing of their PLs and NBs to respond to the discounter 
threat; and (iii) whether discounters should expand the NB presence in their stores to further steal 
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demand from the traditional retailers? To answer the above research questions, we estimate a 
demand model at the consumer level. This model allows for the calculation of counterfactual 
experiments that predict consumer responses to both assortment and price changes in the PL-NB 
choice set of traditional retailers and discounters.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief 
overview of the industry and the data, followed by a section that presents the empirical framework 
with more detail regarding the method of estimation. In section 3.4, we present the empirical results 
and the implied elasticities. In section 3.5, counterfactuals are discussed in detail. Section 3.6 
presents the discussion with managerial implications, and finally we conclude the paper in section 
3.7 with limitations and ideas for further research. 
3.2 Data 
To answer our research questions, we obtained household purchase records of a representative 
sample of UK households (Kantar Worldpanel UK) for the ready-to-eat cereal (RTE) category and 
canned soup category for the period between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2010, provided 
by AiMark. First, both categories enjoy high penetration of PL-tier introduction so three-tier PLs 
are present at the traditional retailers. Second, PL and NB alternatives are present at the 
discounters. Finally, no re-brandings of PLs and NBs, or major PL or NB entries or exits occur 
(i.e. a mature markets) during our observation period. Irrespective of these selection criteria, our 
two categories strongly differ with respect to several potential drivers of PL/NB competition across 
retailers. First of all, NBs consists of only 21% of the soup category, however in the RTE cereal 
category NB share reaches to 45%. Therefore, this gives us the chance of generalizability of the 
results among the categories who reveals different PL-NB concentration. Second, the average 
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yearly category purchase frequency highly differs for the cereal and canned soup category (i.e. 
cereal: 24 and soup: 6). Higher rate of category purchasing corresponds to greater cross-shopping 
across retailers (Narasimhan and Wilcox, 1998) because frequent purchasing affords opportunity 
to shop at multiple retailers. This gives us another chance in terms of generalizability of the results 
across categories.  
Our major advantage of this data set over the other data sets used in PL research is that we 
use the data comprising purchases across multiple retailers whereas previous studies usually cover 
only one retailer (e.g. Hansen et. al. 2006) or focus on each retailer separately (e.g. Geyskens et. 
al. 2010). We focus on all UK leading grocery retailers with a (volume) market share above 2% 
for each category. Accordingly, five traditional retailers (i.e. Asda, Morrisons, Tesco, Tesco Extra 
and Sainsbury’s) and two discounters (Aldi and Lidl) are selected, covering in total 82.3% of the 
UK grocery market. The discounters have a combined market share of 5.62% and 5.89%, for the 
canned soup and cereal category20.   
The UK market is considered as one of the most sophisticated PL markets in the world, 
with a PL share above 45% (PLMA 2014), where all retailers are offering a well-established three-
tiered PL program. Moreover, discounters affect prices well beyond their own stores and pose 
fierce competition (The Guardian 2013). As a result, UK's biggest supermarkets are being 
squeezed out by discounters (The Guardian 2013). As such, “There's a massive global price-war 
in food retailing, much of it provoked by the gains by Aldi and Lidl and other discounters,” (The 
Economist 2008). Likewise, Tesco, the world's fourth-biggest retailer, is engaging a price war 
against Lidl (The Economist 2008). In terms of speed of growth, according to retail analysts, the 
                                                 
20 We have conducted our analysis for the years between 2009 and 2010. In those years, average combined market 
share of two leading discounters (i.e. Aldi and Lidl) is 4.5% across all categories in U.K (Nielsen 2013). Hence, the 
reported market shares for the selected categories are quite representative for the rest of the market.  
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UK will be the fastest growing European market for hard discounters, growing at an 11% 
compound annual growth rate between 2013 and 2018. This prediction is underpinned by rapid 
investment and expansion plans – Aldi plans a 67% expansion to 1,000 outlets by 2022. 
Meanwhile, Lidl has long-term plans to more than double its number of stores in the UK to around 
1,500 (AHDB 2015). Hence, all these facts make the U.K supermarket industry an interesting place 
to study.  
Table 3-1 presents the summary statistics of canned soup and RTE cereal category. This 
table reports per category the average price in equivalent units, the number of SKUs and volume 
market shares for each product group: economy PLs, standard PLs, premium PLs, NBs at 
traditional retailers, discounter PLs and NBs at discounters.21 We divided traditional retailers’ PL 
brands into three quality tiers: low (economy PLs), medium (standard PLs), and upper (premium 
PLs), next to the NBs. Likewise, discounters’ offerings are grouped as discounter PLs and NBs.  
In both categories, economy PLs form the cheapest product group at the traditional 
retailers. Assortment depth is highest for the standard PLs, and premium PLs capture the lowest 
market share at traditional retailers. Moreover, discounters price their PLs between the traditional 
retailers’ economy and standard PLs in both categories. This already challenges the conventional 
belief that economy PLs and discounter PLs are in the same league in terms of price competition. 
Furthermore, discounters set NB prices below traditional retailer NB counterparts which makes 
them the cheapest outlet for NB buyers. Lastly, the discounters’ assortment relies heavily on PLs, 
and the majority of the sales volume within discounters consists of PLs.  
                                                 
21 We adopt the classification used by Geyskens et al. (2010) to group each private label into a quality tier. In addition 
to this, we have also validated this classification ourselves with the Planet Retail’s PL reports as a final check.  
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In terms of category differences, premium PLs are more expensive than NBs in the soup 
category compared to the cereal category. Assortment depth in all product groups as well as PL 
penetration is higher in the cereal category than in the soup category. 
NBs and standard PLs of the traditional retailers have almost equal share within traditional 
retailing format (44.98% and 40.42% respectively) in the cereal category. However, in the soup 
category, NBs of the traditional retailer capture most of the market share. Moreover, the premium 
PLs’ share is also larger in the soup category than in the cereal category. Finally, discounters offer 
more NB options in the soup category than in the cereal category.  
Level of Aggregation  
In line with prior work, we aggregate products across sizes and brand variants to the product level 
(Chintagunta, Bonfrer, and Song 2002; Pauwels and Srinivasan 2004; Geyskens et al. 2010). Next, 
similar to Villas-Boas (2007) and Draganska et al. (2010), we model retailer-brand combinations 
as the alternatives in the choice set to allow for retailer influences on choice behavior. In other 
words, the same product sold by two different retailers is treated as two different alternatives. For 
example, buying Kellogg’s at Sainsbury’s may be a very different experience than buying 
Kellogg’s at Aldi because of price, shelf allocation, display, etc. For the traditional retailers, we 
select NBs that cover 70% of total sales of the retailer, implying that the selected brands may differ 
between retailers22. For the PLs, all brands under premium, standard and economy tiers are 
included. For the discounters, all available PLs and NBs are selected. For the PL selection, we 
aggregate brands into tiers and construct economy, standard and premium PLs product groups. We  
                                                 
22 For example, we observe “Alpen” brand among Asda, Morrisons, Sainsbury, Tesco and Tesco Extra but not at Lidl 
and Aldi. 
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Table 3-1 Summary Statistics 
Canned Soup Price (per Liter)  # SKUs  Volume market shares (%) 
 mean min max SD  mean min max SD  mean min max SD 
Economy PLs 0.50 0.46 0.64 0.08  3 2 4 1  10.99 7.65 14.10 2.91 
Standard PLs 1.21 1.10 1.40 0.11  23 19 26 2  40.42 24.69 45.83 8.90 
Premium PLs 2.52 1.24 3.82 1.21  4 2 9 3  3.59 0.59 11.81 4.67 
Traditional NBs 1.89 1.84 1.93 0.04  22 21 24 2  44.98 32.00 64.96 12.38 
Discounter PLs 0.99 0.88 1.11 0.16  12 9 15 4  88.07 80.04 96.11 11.36 
Discounter NBs 1.64 1.52 1.77 0.18   3 3 4 1   11.92 3.88 19.95 11.36 
               
RTE Cereal Price (per kilo)  # SKUs  Volume market shares (%) 
 mean min max SD  mean min max SD  mean min max SD 
Economy PLs 0.93 0.79 1.02 0.12  5 3 7 2  6.74 2.82 10.46 2.72 
Standard PLs 2.12 1.98 2.28 0.12  42 35 48 5  70.56 68.97 71.41 0.95 
Premium PLs 2.92 2.72 3.43 0.29  2 1 4 1  0.82 0.49 1.14 0.25 
Traditional NBs 3.61 3.49 3.88 0.17  18 17 19 1  21.86 18.42 27.70 3.48 
Discounter PLs 1.92 1.73 2.11 0.27  24 24 24 0  97.81 96.79 98.82 1.43 
Discounter NBs 3.60 3.42 3.86 0.31   2 2 3 1   2.18 1.17 3.20 1.43 
Note: This table reports the summary statistics of the product groups. Mean, min, max and sd show the variations across retailers. 
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adopt the classification of Geyskens et al. (2010) to group each brand into a quality tier (i.e. low, 
medium or high quality), which is based on the retailers’ positioning of the private labels. We 
grouped the other retailer-brand combinations into a composite “outside” product with an average 
market share of 23.3% and 21.6% for the canned soup and RTE cereal category respectively. 
To gain first insights into the competition between the traditional and discount retail format, 
we check whether households visit both discounters and traditional retailers to fulfil their category 
needs. Table 3-2 shows the multi format shopping pattern over six months and one year for each 
category. 
Table 3-2 Distribution of household visits among the traditional retailers and discounters 
 6 months window 1 year window 
Soup   
Only Traditional retailers 11,627 (81.5%) 15,387 (77.5%) 
Only Discounters 759 (5.3%) 767 (3.9%) 
Traditional retailers & Discounters 1,884 (13.2%) 3,692 (18.6%) 
Total hh in sample 14,270 19,846 
   
Cereal   
Only Traditional retailers 17,418 (76.0%) 19,550  (70.9%) 
Only Discounters 672  (2.9%) 535  (1.9%) 
Traditional retailers &  Discounters 4,838  (21.1%) 7,504  (27.2%) 
Total hh in sample 22,928 27,589 
 
With regard to the 6-month window, we see that the majority of the households in our sample 
only shop at traditional retailers (on average 80% in both categories). The share of households who 
solely visit discounters to buy canned soup (cereal) is 5.3% (2.9%). One important observation is 
that the share of households who visit both discounters and traditional retailers is higher in the 
cereal category (21%) than in the soup category (13.2%). Similar percentages are observed for the 
one-year window.  
Chapter 3  
69 
 
3.3 Methodology  
Demand Model 
Consumer demand is modeled using a discrete-choice setting. We apply a random coefficients 
logit model for each category (i.e. RTE cereal and canned soup). Households select a brand at a 
given retailer to maximize their utility23. We define the product as a particular brand (indexed by 
𝑏) sold at a particular retailer (indexed by 𝑟). The indirect utility of household 𝑖 from buying brand 
𝑏 = 1,2, … , 𝐵 from retailer 𝑟 = 1,2, … , 𝑅 at weekly shopping trip24 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 is given by: 
 𝑈𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖𝑟𝑏 + 𝜔𝑖𝐼𝑖𝑏𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑡 − 𝛼𝑖𝑝𝑏𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝐴𝑏𝑟𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑡 (13) 
 
                                   =𝑉𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑡(𝑋𝑏𝑟𝑡, 𝑝𝑏𝑟𝑡, 𝐼𝑖𝑏𝑡) + 𝜖𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑡 
 
 
where 𝑉𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑡(𝑋𝑏𝑟𝑡, 𝑝𝑏𝑟𝑡, 𝐼𝑖𝑏𝑡) represents the deterministic part of utility and 𝜖𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑡 represents the 
unobserved factors that affect household’s utility of purchasing. To take into account that 
households differ in unobserved preferences for the several brand-retailer combinations, we 
include  𝛾𝑖𝑟𝑏, which denotes household 𝑖’s valuation for brand 𝑏 at a retailer 𝑟. 
The variables 𝐼𝑖𝑏𝑡 and 𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑡 are two loyalty variables. First, 𝐼𝑖𝑏𝑡 denotes a dynamic brand 
loyalty variable, suggested by Guadagni and Little (2008) and specified as: 
 𝐼𝑖𝑏𝑡 = 𝜆𝐼𝑖𝑏𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑏𝑡 (14) 
                                                 
23 We didn’t include transportation cost which is households’ cost for travelling from one store to another due to data 
unavailability. However, such transportation cost argument is less appealing when the analysis is conducted at the 
national level of the national retail chains (Draganska et. al 2010).  
24 For some households in certain weeks, multiple purchases within a week are observed (either to same retailer or to 
different retailers), which is the case for 36% of the observed weekly shopping trips. However, these multiple 
purchases are category specific (either the shopper buys the different brands from the same retailer (29%) or from 
different retailers (7%)). For the first case, we construct a variable called first choice brand which is based on the 
households’ previous brand choices. For the latter, we construct a variable called first choice retailer where a 
household spent the most in a given month. Then, for our analysis we select the first choice of brand or retailer.  
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where 𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑏𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to 1 when brand  𝑏25 was last purchased, and 
0 otherwise, 𝜆 is a smoothing constant between 0 and 126 (see Melis et al. 2015 for a similar 
practice). Hence, the parameter 𝜔𝑖 captures a household's "loyalty" or "switching cost" of moving 
from one brand to another (Gordon et al. 2013; Guadagni and Little 2008). Second, 𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑡 denotes 
the retail loyalty variable, which is operationalized as share of wallet. It represents the monthly 
expenditure spent at a given retailer relative the total expenditure of the household across all 
retailers during that month. This has been considered as a proxy for retailer loyalty (Dubois and 
Jodar-Rosell 2010). 
Furthermore, 𝑝𝑏𝑟𝑡 is the average price paid across all households for brand 𝑏 in a retailer 𝑟 
at week t, converted in real terms using the yearly UK consumer price index obtained from the 
Office for National Statistics in the UK, and 𝛼𝑖 is a household-specific valuation of price. To 
capture consumer heterogeneity in price response, we consider a specification that allows for both 
observed and unobserved household heterogeneity. We assume that the price coefficient 𝛼𝑖 varies 
across households according to 
 𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼
0 + ∑ 𝛼ℎ𝐻𝐻𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟ℎ𝑖 + 𝛼
𝜎𝜈𝑖
𝑟                    𝑣𝑖~𝑁(0,1)    
ℎ
 
(15) 
where 𝛼0 is the mean responsiveness to the price, common across households. To account for 
observed heterogeneity, we interact price with the observed household characteristics 𝐻𝐻𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟ℎ𝑖. 
Based prior literature and data availability, we include the following observed household 
                                                 
25 Here for the brand loyalty, we didn’t specify NBs differently for each retailer. Hence, we define loyalty as to brand 
itself not brand-retailer combination. For instance, households’ loyalty to Kellogg’s brand but not Kellogg’s in 
Sainsbury’s. For PLs, we specify loyalty as brand-retailer combination since PLs are specific to retailers and not 
available in other retailers. 
26 In line with prior research (Spotts 2014 and Gupta 1988), the smoothing constant is set equal to 0.7. Still, the same 
substantive findings are obtained for alternative smoothing constants (0.6, 0.75 and 0.87).  
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characteristics: Number of Childreni, Social Classi (i.e. lower versus middle versus upper) and 
Share of Walleti. To account for unobserved heterogeneity for price, we use a random coefficient 
specification (Chintagunta et al. 2002). Here, 𝛼𝜎 is the standard deviation around the mean 
valuation of price and 𝜐𝑖 is a random draw from the standard normal distribution, capturing 
unobserved household heterogeneity regarding price27. 
The assortment variable 𝐴𝑗𝑡 quantifies the number of SKU’s available for brand 𝑏 at retailer 
𝑟, and 𝛽𝑖 captures a household i’s valuation with respect to the assortment variable. We also allow 
for heterogeneity for the assortment variable, assuming that the effect of assortment depth differs 
among the households. 
 
                    𝛽𝑖 = 𝛽
0 + 𝛽𝜎𝜈𝑖
𝑟              𝑣𝑖~𝑁(0,1)    (16) 
Finally, 𝜖𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑡 is a household i specific valuation for brand 𝑏 at retailer r in week t i.e. the 
“logit error term”. It is identically and independently distributed according to the Type I extreme 
value distribution.  
The outside good option where the (𝐽 + 1)𝑡ℎ alternative indexed by 𝑏 = 𝑟 = 0 refers to a 
household's option to purchase a composite outside brand-retailer combination formed as the 
collection of other retailers’ brands in the category. It has a normalized utility of 𝑈𝑖00𝑡 = 𝜖𝑖00𝑡. 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 In the special case where 𝛼𝜎 = 0, there is no unobserved heterogeneity and we would obtain the conditional logit 
model. 
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Estimation 
We specify the probability 𝑃𝑟𝑏𝑟𝑡 that household 𝑖 chooses brand 𝑏 in retailer 𝑟 as follows 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑏𝑟𝑡 = ∫
exp(𝛾𝑖𝑟𝑏 + 𝜔𝑖𝐼𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑡 − 𝛼𝑖𝑝𝑏𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝐴𝑏𝑟𝑡)
1 + ∑ ∑ exp (𝑅𝑠=1
𝐵
𝑘=1 𝛾𝑖𝑘𝑠 + 𝜔𝑖𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡 − 𝛼𝑖𝑝𝑘𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝐴𝑘𝑠𝑡)
𝑓(𝜃)𝑑𝜃 (17) 
with 𝑓(𝜃) the normal density function of the random coefficients 𝜃.  𝜃 includes price coefficient 
𝛼𝑖, assortment coefficient 𝛽𝑖 and outside good dummy coefficient 𝛾𝑖0. Given the size of our data 
set, where 24,963 households choose between 48 options in the canned soup category and 29,716 
households choose between 50 options in the cereal category over the two years, we select a 
random subsample of 10% of the households in the canned soup category and 10% in the cereal 
category (see Chintagunta (1993) for a similar practice). That leaves us 2,496 and 2,971 
households for soup and cereal categories respectively. We estimate the model with maximum 
likelihood and assume that the coefficients are drawn from a normal density function 𝑓(𝜃) to 
generate 100 draws of the coefficients for each household in line with Train (2003).  
Own- and Cross-price Elasticities 
Since we are mainly interested in the substitution pattern between product groups and not between 
individual products, we calculate product group-level price elasticities for all PL and NB groups 
that are sold in traditional retailers and discounters (i.e. economy PL, standard PL, premium PL, 
NB at traditional retailers, discounter PL and NB at discounters) (see Grzybowski et al. (2014) for 
an in-depth discussion). More specifically, a group-level elasticity is the percentage change in 
demand for a group of products in response to a 1% change in the price of all products in this 
group. To calculate the own group-level price elasticity, we proceed as follows. For the ease of 
exposition, we drop time t. The aggregate market share for product 𝑗 in the same group 𝛿1  (e.g. 
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economy PL 1, economy PL 2) is defined as 𝑠𝛿1 ≡ ∑ ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗 𝑁⁄𝑗∈𝛿1 𝑖 , where 𝑁 is the number of 
households. Then the group-level own price elasticity of demand for the product in group 𝛿1 with 
respect to the price increase of all products in a same group 𝛿1 may be defined as: 
 
𝜀𝛿1𝛿1  =
∑ (−𝛼𝑖)[∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖𝑗(1 − ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗)𝑗∈𝛿1 𝑗∈𝛿1 ]𝑖
∑ ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑗∈𝛿1𝑖
 (18) 
Similarly, to calculate the group level cross-price elasticity, we define  𝑗 = 1 … 𝐽 products in group 
𝛿1  and k=1…..K products in group 𝛿2. Then the group-level cross-price elasticity of demand for 
the group of products  𝛿1 with respect to the price increase of all products in group 𝛿2 may be 
defined as the following: 
 
𝜀𝛿1𝛿2 =
∑ (−𝛼𝑖)[(∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗)(∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑝𝑖𝑘)𝑘∈𝛿2𝑗∈𝛿1 ]𝑖
∑ ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑗∈𝛿1𝑖
 (19) 
3.4 Empirical Results 
Table 3-3 presents the estimates for the canned soup and cereal category. Overall, we find that the 
results generalize reasonably well for both categories. The negative price coefficient (soup: -895.5; 
p<.01 and cereal: -751.2; p<.01), indicates that households are overall price sensitive. The 
interactions with household characteristics indicate that there is significant observed 
heterogeneity. Besides this observed consumer heterogeneity in price sensitivity, there is also 
significant unobserved heterogeneity regarding the valuation of price (soup: SD=671.0; p<.01 and 
cereal: SD=416.2; p<.01), as has also been reported in previous literature (Chintagunta et al. 2002; 
Meza and Sudhir 2010). Moreover, there is significant unobserved heterogeneity for the valuation 
of assortment among consumers (soup: SD=0.011; p<.01 and cereal: SD=0.014; p<.01). Also, the 
positive and significant mean effects of assortment is consistent with the idea that the service level 
Chapter 3  
74 
 
of a retailer increases consumer willingness to pay (soup: 0.029; p<.01 and cereal: 0.013; p<.01) 
(Draganska et al. 2010). We find that the impact of assortment size is not significantly different at 
discounters than at retailers in the soup category. In contrast, in the cereal category the impact of 
assortment size is significantly lower at discounters (-0.03; p<0.1). This finding is consistent with 
the recent literature on variety. It has been documented that an increase in variety is not always 
appreciated by consumers (Mantrala et al. 2009). Especially consumers who shop at discounters 
find the shopping process easy since there are not many products to choose from (Kumar and 
Steenkamp 2007). However, assortment depth of NBs in discounters positively affects the demand 
(soup: 0.22; p<.01 and cereal: 0.73; p<.01). This means that assortment size at discounters is even 
more important for the NBs compared to its PLs, and PLs/NBs at traditional retailers and with the 
increased variety in NBs, consumers find a product that matches their preferences and in general, 
variety seeking consumers are better served (Lin et al. 2012).  
The significant positive brand loyalty coefficient (soup: 6.47; p<.01 and cereal: 6.34; 
p<.01) reveals state dependence, which implies that a brand has a higher probability of being 
purchased if it has been bought on previous purchase occasions, supporting the prior work 
(Geyskens et al. 2010 and Pauwels et al. 2002). Similarly, retailer loyalty has a positive and 
significant effect on demand (soup: 6.11; p<.01 and cereal: 5.67; p<.01).  
Finally, the random coefficient on the outside good reflects consumer heterogeneity 
regarding the valuation of the inside goods relative to the outside good (soup: SD=1.97; p<.01 and 
cereal: SD=2.41; p<.01). On average, the significant random coefficient for the outside good 
dummy variable indicates that substitution between inside goods (selected traditional retailers and  
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Table 3-3 Estimation Results 
     Interactions with household characteristics 
Variables Mean Std. dev.  # children Low class 
Middle 
class 
Retail 
Loyalty 
Brand 
Loyalty 
Canned Soup Category 
Price 
-895.5*** 671.0*** -93.28*** -295.2*** -6.187 689.0*** -24.11 
(115.9) (33.15) (25.48) (86.90) (72.75) (74.44) (133.6) 
Assortment 
0.0291*** 0.0118***      
(0.00328) (0.00148) 
Outside Good 
3.557*** 1.973***      
(0.193) (0.0689) 
Brand Loyalty 
6.477*** 
      
(0.248) 
Retail Loyalty 
6.119***       
(0.142) 
Assortment* 
Discounter 
0.00772       
(0.0238) 
Assortment*NB 
*Discounter 
0.221***       
(0.0726) 
Brand Dummies Yes       
Log Likelihood  -23178 
 # of obs. 902,900    
Cereal Category 
Price 
-751.2*** 416.2*** 38.23*** -35.45 -37.42 405.2*** -151.6*** 
(38.30) (12.99) (11.23) (36.87) (32.43) (27.67) (47.30) 
Assortment 
0.0135*** 0.0146***      
(0.00432) (0.000787) 
Outside Good 
1.943*** 2.417***      
(0.187) (0.0720) 
Brand Loyalty 
6.345***       
(0.167) 
Retail Loyalty 
5.675***       
(0.125) 
Assortment* 
Discounter 
-0.0345*       
(0.0267) 
Assortment*NB 
*Discounter 
0.727***       
(0.267) 
Brand Dummies Yes       
Log Likelihood  -47847   # of obs. 3,012,324       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Note: The parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) of the mean 
effects are shown in the second column. Column 3 shows estimates of the random coefficients, while columns 
4-7 show estimates of the interaction effects between price and household characteristics. 
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discounters) is stronger than substitution towards the outside good (remaining small 
retailers’ offerings and other formats (e.g. home delivery) (soup: 3.55; p<.01 and cereal: 1.94; 
p<.01) 28.  
To obtain insights into brand switching pattern across retailers, we present the derived own-
price and cross-price elasticities at the product group level for each retail format in Table 3-4 and 
Table 3-5. To make the tables clear, we divided the tables into four panels. Panel (i) indicates the 
switching pattern within traditional retailers. Similarly, panel (iv) indicates the switching pattern 
within discounters’ offerings. Panel (ii) and (iii) show the cross-elasticities between traditional 
retailers and discounters. 
All group-level own-price elasticities are negative. For instance, in Table 3-4, the own-
price elasticity for standard PL in the soup category of -0.77 indicates that a 1% price increase for 
all standard PL products of traditional retailers reduces the demand for these alternatives by 0.77%. 
The own-price elasticities range from -0.36 (-0.61) for economy PLs to -1.36 (-1.95) for premium 
PLs of traditional retailers in the soup (cereal) category. For discounters, this range is from -0.33 
(-0.53) for discounter PLs to -1.02 (-2.65) for NBs in the soup (cereal) category. Moreover, the 
cross-elasticity patterns between traditional retailers’ offerings and discounters’ offerings reveal 
already some interesting takeaways to understand the competition between PL and NB tiers. As 
indicated in Table 3-4 and Table 3-5, the cross-price elasticities are small but non-zero (between 
traditional retailers and discounters). This is in line with recent empirical evidence that there is 
retail format competition (see, e.g., Hartmann and Nair 2007 and Draganska et. al. (2010)). The 
                                                 
28 To check the consumer heterogeneity among the valuation of the product groups (e.g. economy PLs, standard 
PLs,..), product group dummies were interacted with households characteristics. Since these did not appear to be 
significant, they are not included in the main model specification.   
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first important observation is that price changes affect demand mainly within retail formats, hence 
there is limited substitution from traditional retailers to discounters (panel ii) and vice versa (panel 
iii). 
Moreover, when we look at the individual product groups within panels, a first interesting 
observation is that if the prices of NBs in traditional retailers are increased with 1%, consumer 
both stay in traditional retailer format and switch to all available PL options 0.71 (0.55) economy. 
Table 3-4 Aggregate level own- and cross-price elasticity matrix for the Canned Soup category 
  Traditional  
 Discounter 
  
Economy 
PL 
Standard 
PL 
Premium 
PL 
NB  
Discounter 
PL 
NB 
 
 (i)  (ii) 
Traditional Economy PL -0.36 0.02 0.03 0.01  0.004 0.002 
 Standard PL 0.17 -0.77 0.19 0.08  0.03 0.02 
 Premium PL 0.03 0.02 -1.36 0.01  0.004 0.002 
 NB 0.71 0.64 0.76 -0.42  0.10 0.52 
  (iii)  (iv) 
Discounter Discounter PL 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  -0.33 0.22 
 NB 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004   0.04 -1.02 
Note: The table reports the percentage change in demand for groups (columns), due to % changes in prices of groups 
(rows). 
Table 3-5 Aggregate level own- and cross-price elasticity matrix for the Cereal category 
  Traditional  
 Discounter 
  
Economy 
PL 
Standard 
PL 
Premium 
PL 
NB  
Discounter 
PL 
NB 
 
 (i)  (ii) 
Traditional Economy PL -0.61 0.01 0.02 0.01  0.01 0.01 
Standard PL 0.29 -0.85 0.35 0.25  0.08 0.10 
Premium PL 0.003 0.003 -1.95 0.002  0.001 0.001 
NB 0.55 0.40 0.65 -1.50  0.14 0.60 
  (iii)  (iv) 
Discounter Discounter PL 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02  -0.53 0.58 
NB 0.00 0.00 0.001 0.001   0.02 -2.65 
Note: The table reports the percentage change in demand for groups (columns), due to % changes in prices of groups 
(rows). 
 
PLs, 0.64 (0.40) standard PLs and 0.76 (0.65) premium PLs and also switch to discounters’ NB 
options 0.52 (0.60) in soup (cereal) category. Moreover, if the price of NBs in discounters are 
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increased, consumers mainly stay in the discounter format and switch to discounters’ PLs (0.04 in 
soup and 0.02 in cereal). However, there is limited substitution takes place towards traditional 
retailers’ NBs (0.004 in soup and 0.001 in cereal) and PL tiers (0.001 in soup and cereal). 
Furthermore, since one of our main interest to shed some light on the effectives of economy 
versus standard PL versus premium PL tiers of traditional retailers to compete with discounters’ 
PLs, it is interesting to look at cross-price elasticities between these tiers and discounters’ PLs. 
Cross-price effect of standard PLs with respect to discounters’ PLs is (0.03 in soup and 0.08 in 
cereal) bigger than the cross-price effect of economy and premium PLs w.r.t discounters’ PLs 
(0.004 for economy and premium PLs in soup category and 0.01 and 0.001 for economy and 
premium PLs in cereal category). This indicates that standard PLs of traditional retailers mainly 
compete with discounters’ PLs. In addition, if the price of discounters’ PLs are increased, 
consumers mainly stay in discounters and switch to NBs (0.22 in soup and 0.58 in cereal) and 
partially switch to PLs and NBs of traditional retailers (0.01 in soup and 0.02 in cereal).  
In sum, these findings on cross-price elasticities already give some insights on the inter tier 
competition across traditional retailers and discounters. We will explore this in much more detail 
in our counterfactuals in the next section by using not only price but full model estimates. 
3.5 Counterfactuals 
We can use the results of the demand model to simulate the impact of alternative scenarios on both 
traditional retailers and discounters. Our way of tackling this question is as follows. First thanks 
to our “dropping” scenarios (e.g. dropping economy PLs, dropping standard PLs, dropping 
premium PLs and dropping discounter PLs), we aim to identify “who competes with whom”. 
Although, these scenarios sound extreme, it allows us to get a better grip on the competition. As a 
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follow up, we test the effectiveness of more realistic counterfactuals that are listed in business 
press for both parties (i.e. discounters and traditional retailers), namely setting more competitive 
prices for standard PLs and/or NBs in traditional retailers and increasing the assortment size in 
discounters to provide possible strategies to further grow in this competitive environment.  
In Table 3-6 and Table 3-7, we first present the random coefficient logit model’s predicted 
percentage market shares of the groups if there is no change in strategy as a benchmark setting 
(first row). For instance, in the canned soup category the predicted market share is 72.4% for all 
traditional retailers and 6% for the discounters. The remaining 21.6% is captured by the outside 
good. We will now compare this with the outcomes of several counterfactuals. We express these 
as percentage point changes relative the random coefficient logit model predicted choice shares 
(benchmark setting). 
(i) Which PL tier competes with the discounters?  
First, we present the predicted changes in the market shares after dropping the economy PLs from 
traditional retailers’ assortment for the canned soup and cereal category. Total demand of 
traditional retailers would decrease by 2.1 and 1.2 percentage points for soup and cereal 
respectively, and discounters would increase their market share by 0.1 percentage points. To 
disentangle which product groups win or lose, we also decompose the total change in demand for 
traditional and discounters by looking at NBs and each PL tier. Table 3-6 and Table 3-7 show that 
the market share of standard PLs in traditional retailers mainly increases (+0.9 percentage points) 
for soup and cereal after the elimination of economy PLs. Moreover, dropping economy PLs leads 
a demand shift to NBs of traditional retailers (+0.1 percentage points for soup and cereal) and also 
discounters’ own brands (+0.1 percentage point). This result is consistent with the findings of 
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Vroegrijk et al. (2016). They find that economy PLs might help the traditional retailers to preserve 
share-of-wallet among its loyal customers, and even enhance overall category sales in the 
competition with regular supermarkets, although they are not a particularly good defensive tool 
against discounters. Second, we present the changes in market shares after dropping the standard 
PLs from traditional retailers’ assortment. Results show that standard PLs mainly compete with 
NBs of traditional retailers (+5.4 and +15.0 percentage points) increase in NB shares for the soup 
and cereal category. However, they also compete with economy PLs (+1.2 and +1.3 percentage 
points) and discounters’ PLs (+0.3 and +1.1 percentage points) in respectively the soup and cereal 
category. The latter is a big increase knowing that the discounter PLs only have 6% market share 
on average in both categories. Moreover, dropping the premium PLs scenario shows that 
consumers of the traditional retailers stay within the traditional format for the soup (cereal) 
category and switch almost equally to economy PL tier, i.e. with 0.2 (0.05) percentage points, and 
standard PL tier, i.e. with 0.3 (0.03) percentage points) and also NBs, i.e. with 0.4 (0.04) percentage 
points. However, discounters’ PLs still manage to steal a limited part of premium PL market share 
(i.e. 0.002 and 0.003 percentage points in the soup and cereal category respectively).   
Finally, dropping the discounter PLs scenario reveals that consumers either mainly stay 
in the discounters and purchase available NBs, i.e. with 1.0 (0.4) percentage points or switch to 
traditional retailers’ standard PLs, i.e. with 0.3 (1.6) percentage points for the soup (cereal) 
category. Hence, these findings indicate that especially the standard PLs who are able to steal 
market share from the discounters, followed by the economy PLs. The competition between the 
premium PL tier and the discounters’ PLs is very limited. 
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Table 3-6 Different scenarios for the canned soup category 
 Traditional Retailers  Discounters  
Economy 
PLs 
Standard 
PLs 
Premium 
PLs 
 
NBs Total 
 
Discounter 
PL 
NBs Total 
Choice shares 
(benchmark setting) 
3.20% 10.90% 1.10%  57.20% 72.40%  5.40% 0.60% 6.00% 
Traditional Retailers' Scenarios: 
Drop economy PLs (-)3.2 (+)0.9 (+)0.1 
 (+)0.1 (-)2.1  (+)0.1 (+)0.0 (+)0.1 
Drop standard PLs (+)1.2 (-)10.9 (+)0.3 
 (+)5.4 (-)3.9  (+)0.3 (+)0.0 (+)0.3 
Drop premium PLs (+)0.2 (+)0.3 (-)1.1 
 (+)0.4 (-)0.2  (+)0.02 (+)0.0 (+)0.02 
Decrease standard 
PL price by 20% 
(-)0.2 (+)1.7 (-)0.0  (-)0.9 (+)0.6  (-)0.0 (+)0.0 (-)0.0 
Decrease standard 
PL price by 30% 
(-)0.3 (+)2.6 (-)0.1  (-)1.5 (+)0.7  (-)0.1 (+)0.0 (-)0.1 
Decrease NB prices 
by 15% 
(-)0.4 (-)1.0 (-)0.1  (+)2.8 (+)1.3  (-)0.1 (+)0.0 (-)0.1 
Discounters' Scenarios: 
Increase assortment 
size of NBs 
(+)0.0 (+)0.0 (+)0.0  (-)0.2 (-)0.2  (-)0.1 (+)0.3 (+)0.2 
Decrease discounter 
PL price by 20% 
(-)0.05 (-)0.1 (-)0.0  (-)0.05 (-)0.2  (+)1.0 (-)0.2 (+)0.8 
Decrease discounter 
PL price by 30% 
(-)0.06 (-)0.15 (-)0.0  (-)0.06 (-)0.3  (+)1.2 (-)0.3 (+)0.9 
Drop discounters 
PLs 
(+)0.1 (+)0.3 (+)0.0   (+)0.1 (+)0.5   (-)5.4 (+)1.0 (-)4.4 
(ii) Should traditional retailers adjust the pricing of their PLs and NBs? 
On the one hand, one way for traditional retailers to fight discounters might be establishing more 
competitive prices for their standard PLs (Ailawadi et al. 2010; Gielens et al. 2008). In practice, 
this action is already seen. ASDA and Morrisons, the UK's 'Big Four' supermarkets with the largest 
overlap with hard discounters, have reacted by announcing a further round of price cuts (Reuters 
2014). To test this, we consider the effect of adjustments in the price of standard PLs by decreasing 
its price by 20% (30%). These price drops result in a demand increase for standard PLs (i.e. 
respectively +1.7 (+2.6) percentage points for soup and +3.9 (+5.9) percentage points for cereal), 
mainly at the expense of NBs -0.9 (-1.5) for soup and -2.4 (-3.7) for cereal and almost no effect 
for premium PLs in both categories sold at the traditional retailers. However, this strategy helps 
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traditional retailers to steal some share from discounters (-0.1 percentage points on average for 
soup and -0.25 percentage points for the cereal category).  
Table 3-7 Different scenarios for the cereal category 
 Traditional Retailers  Discounters  
Economy 
PLs 
Standard 
PLs 
Premium 
PLs 
 
NBs Total 
 
Discounter 
PL 
NBs Total 
Choice shares 
(benchmark setting) 
2.23% 23.73% 0.09%  46.66% 72.71%  6.71% 0.04% 6.75% 
Traditional Retailers' Scenarios: 
Drop economy PLs (-)2.2 (+)0.9 (+)0.01 
 (+)0.1 (-)1.2  (+)0.1 (+)0.0 (+)0.1 
Drop standard PLs (+)1.3 (-)23.7 (+)0.1 
 (+)15.0 (-)7.3  (+)1.1 (+)0.0 (+)1.1 
Drop premium PLs (+)0.05 (+)0.03 (-)0.09 
 (+)0.04 (-)0.03  (+)0.03 (+)0.0 (+)0.03 
Decrease standard 
PL price by 20% 
(-)0.2 (+)3.9 (-)0.01  (-)2.4 (+)1.2  (-)0.2 (-)0.0 (-)0.2 
Decrease standard 
PL price by 30% 
(-)0.3 (+)5.9 (-)0.01  (-)3.7 (+)1.9  (-)0.3 (-)0.0 (-)0.3 
Decrease NB prices 
by 15% 
(-)0.4 (-)2.8 (-)0.02  (+)5.3 (+)2.1  (-)0.3 (-)0.01 (-)0.31 
Discounters' Scenarios: 
Increase assortment 
size of NBs 
(-)0.0 (-)0.0 (-)0.0  (-)0.0 (-)0.0  (-)0.0 (+)0.0 (+)0.0 
Decrease discounter 
PL price by 20% 
(-)0.1 (-)0.8 (-)0.0  (-)0.5 (-)1.4  (+)1.2 (-)0.08 (+)1.1 
Decrease discounter 
PL price by 30% 
(-)0.2 (-)1.0 (-)0.0  (-)0.7 (-)1.9  (+)1.6 (-)0.1 (+)1.5 
Drop discounters 
PLs 
(+)0.3 (+)1.6 (+)0.01   (+)1.0 (+)2.9   (-)6.7 (+)0.4 (-)6.3 
On the other hand, traditional retailers might offer price cuts for their NB offerings instead 
of decreasing the price of standard PLs to fight the discounters. For instance, Tesco recently 
announced that they will fight back against the growth of discount supermarkets by cutting the 
price of hundreds of branded products including Hovis bread, Kellogg's cornflakes and some other 
NBs (Reuters 2015). The company said that the average reduction of about 380 branded products 
would be around 25%. To test this, we use an illustrative example by conducting a 15% price cut 
for NBs. We find that this action negatively affects discounters’ PLs (-0.1 percentage point for 
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soup and -0.3 percentage points for cereal) and leads a demand increase for traditional retailers’ 
NBs (+2.8 percentage points for soup and +5.3 percentage points for cereal), however their 
economy and standard PLs also lose market share (-0.4 and -1.0 percentage points for soup and -
0.4 and -2.8 percentage points for cereal). We didn’t use 20% and 30% price cuts for the NBs since 
these price cuts would make the NBs cheaper than the standard PLs which is never the case in the 
market. The chosen 15% price cut closes the gap between NBs and premium PLs while keeping 
the NBs still more expensive than standard PLs. 
An important observation is that 30% price cut for standard PLs and 15% price cut for NBs 
affects discounters’ share almost in a same way in terms of magnitude, however, these price cuts 
also lead cannibalization and stealing market share effect within traditional retailers. If we compare 
the net demand effect of these actions for the traditional retailers, it seems that cutting NB prices 
can be more preferable since the net market share effect of this action (1.4 and 2.1 percentage 
points) outweigh the net market share effect of standard PL price cut (0.7 and 1.9 percentage 
points) for the soup and cereal category respectively.  
(iii) Should discounters adjust the price of their own PLs? 
 One way for discounters to steal market share from traditional retailers is to adjust their PLs’ 
prices (The Telegraph 2016). In the current setting, they set the price of their own brands less than 
(but very close to) standard PLs and more than economy PLs of the traditional retailers. By 
conducting 20% and 30% price cuts for the discounters’ own PLs, we make their price closer to 
economy PLs. Results show that these price drops result in a demand increase for discounter PLs 
(i.e. respectively +1.0 (+1.2) percentage points for soup and +1.2 (+1.6) percentage points for 
cereal), mainly at the expense of their NBs of -0.2 (-0.3) for soup and -0.08 (-0.1) for cereal and 
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standard PLs at the traditional retailers -0.1 (-0.15) for soup and -0.8 (-0.1) for cereal. In the end, 
this strategy helps discounters to steal some share from traditional retailers (-0.25 percentage 
points on average for soup and -1.6 percentage points for the cereal category).  
(iv) Should discounters expand the NB presence in their stores?  
Although discounters focus on minimal assortment, relying on their PLs and competitive prices 
compared to traditional retailers, they have realized that growth strategies based on prices makes 
them vulnerable to incoming discounters as well as traditional retailers. Due to this realization, 
discounters are increasingly introducing NBs in their assortments. Recently, Aldi announced that 
they are further expanding the NBs of various manufacturers (Bord Bia 2016). This creates even 
more direct competition with traditional retailers and their main competitor Lidl, which 
successfully lists both branded and private label products. On the other hand, manufacturers use 
this opportunity to alleviate their independency on traditional retailers, who have developed their 
PL tiers (Ailawadi et. al. 2008, Lourenco and Gijsbrechts 2013). Hence, encouraging discounters 
to carry more manufacturer brands and deeper assortments may be an effective way to keep 
traditional retailers’ PLs at bay (Dhar and Hoch 1997). This in turn, creates a win-win situation for 
both discounters and brand manufacturers at the expense of traditional retailers (Deleersnyder et. 
al. 2007). In our data, we already observe the presence of one or two leading NBs in both 
categories. However, discounters sell them on a temporary base or the assortment depth of the 
existing NBs is quite limited. For example, although consumers find Kellogg’s cereals in the 
shelves of both discounters and traditional retailers, the available alternatives (e.g. Kellogg’s 
Special K or Kellogg’s Choco Pops) for Kellogg’s are very limited in discounters compared to 
traditional retailers. Hence, it is a highly relevant question to test the possible increase in the 
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assortment depth of the NBs in discounters on the market shares of the traditional retailers and 
discounters. To test the effect of this action on market shares of the incumbent players, we 
hypothetically increase the number of available SKUs (assortment depth) for the available NBs in 
discounters with two29. Our findings reveal that this especially benefits the discounters’ market 
share at the expense of the NBs in the traditional retailers. The market share of NBs in traditional 
retailers decrease 0.2 percentage points in the soup category and 0.0004 percentage points in the 
cereal category. The latter is extremely low which is strongly driven by the fact that cereal NBs 
are hardly ever bought in this category, probably due to the low availability together with the 
relatively high price compared to the same brand at the traditional retailers.  
3.6 Discussion 
In this study, we have analysed the impact of PL tiers on the competition between traditional 
retailers and discounters. We estimated two random coefficient logit models for the choices in 
respectively the canned soup and cereal category. The adopted model allows for unobserved 
heterogeneity regarding the valuations of alternatives (inside good versus outside good) and 
regarding the sensitivity to assortment and price, which implies richer substitution pattern.  
Our main substantive findings are as follows. First, thanks to our “dropping” scenarios 
(e.g. dropping economy PLs, dropping standard PLs, dropping premium PLs and dropping 
discounter PLs), we aim to identify “who competes with whom”. In particular, we compare the 
effectiveness of three PLs offered by traditional retailers compete with discounters: standard PLs 
                                                 
29 For example, Aldi offers Kellogg’s brand but the variety of the offerings within Kellogg’s is limited. The current 
assortment only consists of 3 Kellogg’s offerings (3SKUs). We then hypothetically introduce two new SKUs (e.g. 
Kellogg’s Special K or Kellogg’s Choco Pops) by increasing the assortment from 3 to 5.  
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versus premium PLs versus economy PLs. Especially the latter is specifically designed to fight 
with discounters (Global Retail Mag 2014). We find that premium PLs do not seem an effective 
strategy in this fight. They mainly cannibalize the traditional retailers’ standard PLs and steal 
market share from their NBs in both categories. On the other hand, although economy PLs manage 
to steal some market share from discounters, they mainly cannibalize standard PLs. Standard PLs 
seem the most effective strategy to fight discounters since they steal most market share from 
discounters. To reinforce this finding, we test this with a reverse strategy namely “dropping 
discounter PLs”. Similarly, we find that the lost discounter PL share is absorbed by standard PLs 
of traditional retailers. Moreover, there is an ongoing discussion in the grocery retailing industry 
whether introducing economy PLs is really a right strategy to fight with discounters since in the 
end the net effect of this strategy for the retailer is a big question mark in terms of profitability. To 
test this, we obtained average margin data per product for the cereal category from AiMark 
together with the accompanying standard deviation (for a comparable retailer in the Dutch 
market)30. Results show that introducing economy PLs may erode the category profit by 0.6%. 
Hence, both demand and profit implications show that introducing economy PLs does not help 
traditional retailers in the fight with discounters since it fails to steal significant share from 
discounters, cannibalize own offerings as well as erode category profitability.  
Secondly, we propose more realistic alternative policy changes for both parties (traditional 
versus discounter) which have been highly discussed in the business press. For traditional retailers, 
results reveal that (i) decreasing standard PL prices by 30% (ii) and decreasing NB prices by 15% 
affect the discounters’ PLs in a similar way. Hence both options are effective tools to keep 
                                                 
30 Knowing that retailers strongly differ in the adopted margins between categories and between brand types and 
quality tiers, we follow Hökelekli et al. (2017)’s approach where a set of sensitivity analyses are conducted given the 
observed standard deviation of each product. 
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discounters at bay. However, since these strategies also affect traditional retailers’ own offerings 
(PL/NB), the net demand effect for traditional retailers is also important. Among these three 
options, implementing a price cut for NBs seems a more favourable option for traditional retailers, 
since the market share gain for NBs (3.7 percentage points in soup and 7.1 percentage points in 
cereal) offset the demand loss for all PL options (1.9 percentage points in soup and 4.2 percentage 
points in cereal). Furthermore, the profit implications (for the cereal category using the same 
margins discussed above) of these price cuts suggest that a retailer is worse off in terms of 
profitability by 32% if the prices of standard PLs are reduced by 30% in the cereal category. 
Similarly, decreasing NB prices by 15% leads to an even bigger decrease in the category profits 
by 45% in the cereal category. Generally speaking, the combined demand and profit implications 
can be interpreted as follows: fighting with discounters hurts traditional retailers’ profits in the 
short run, but prevents discounters to further grow in the end (and so is likely to protects long term 
profits of the traditional retailers in that category but probably also other categories). 
Thirdly, our findings indicate that increasing the assortment depth of the current available 
NBs, by offering more brand variants of the same brand, benefits discounters to gain market share, 
mainly at the expense of NB sales at the traditional retailers. Finally, offering price cuts for their 
own PLs benefit discounters at the expense of standard PLs of the traditional retailers. 
Managerial Implications 
Understanding how traditional retailers and discounters fight with each other is critical to both 
retailers (traditional versus discounters) and NB manufacturers. When discounters enter a local 
market, traditional retailers are severely affected and incur sales losses of approximately 17% on 
average (Ailawadi et al. 2010; Vroegrijk et al. 2013). For retailers, we challenge the common belief 
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that introducing economy PLs is the most appealing strategy in response to such discounter threat 
(Vroegrijk et al. 2013). However, we show that negative effects can result from this strategy. 
Offering economy PLs can result in cannibalization (IPLC 2014). In addition to this, shopper 
surveys reveal that UK shoppers believe the quality of discounters’ PLs are comparable to standard 
PLs of the traditional retailers (Just Food 2015). Indeed, our results show that discounters’ PLs 
mainly compete with standard PLs of the traditional retailers. Thus, if traditional retailers want to 
mitigate the loss that is incurred due to discounters, they should mainly focus on their standard PL 
tier and its pricing strategies. But if economy PLs fail to compete with discounters which they 
were actually designed for, with whom do they then compete? To reveal some insights on this, we 
simply check the retailer-specific counterfactuals for the economy PL tier in the canned soup 
category. Table 3-8 in the appendix shows the switching pattern when the economy PL tier is 
dropped in one retailer. We find that economy PLs of traditional retailers actually compete more 
strongly with each other and as well as standard PLs instead of discounters. Hence, there is strong 
intra-tier competition across traditional retailers’ economy PL alternatives and inter tier 
competition w.r.t standard PLs. This is in line with the findings of Vroegrijk et al. (2016), who 
find that even though economy PLs are not a particularly good defensive tool against discounters, 
they might be useful to withstand competition with other (possibly lower-priced options) 
traditional retailers.  
We also believe that brand manufacturers can use the traditional retailers-discounters fight 
to their own benefit. On the one hand, they can team up with traditional retailers and allow to set 
more competitive prices for their NBs. We find that decreasing the price of NBs in traditional 
retailers can be a strategy to help both brand manufacturers and traditional retailers in terms of 
demand, hence creating a win-win situation. On the other hand, they can work with discounters 
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and increase their availability in discounter stores, which again benefits both them and the 
discounters. 
3.7 Limitations and future research 
Our research has several limitations that offer interesting avenues for future research. In 
this study, we analyze in detail two fast moving consumer goods categories. Although the selected 
categories differ in terms of PL concentration and purchase frequency among others, future 
research should extend the set of categories under investigation, to further generalize our findings 
and to reveal underlying category drivers of NB-PL competition both across and within traditional 
retailers and discounters. That would, in turn, allow researchers to understand how competition 
differs according to (i) the category’s role for the retailer, (ii) the category’s growth potential, and 
(iii) the NB’s marketing conduct in the category. In addition, our findings are not necessarily 
generalizable to broader market contexts in which PLs are common, for instance clothing or home-
ware.  
Second, our data all come from one geographic market (national level), so we do not 
consider the location effect. In fact, being located close to traditional retailers for discounters can 
mitigate losses, since becoming part of a twin location with the discounters may turn the traditional 
supermarket into an attractive option for combined visits (Vroegrijk et al. 2013). Moreover, this 
strategy may result in a win-win situation for both traditional retailers and discounters, since it can 
create inter-store synergy and increase consumers’ spending (Ailawadi et al. 2010; Singh, Hansen, 
and Blattberg 2006).  
Third, from our findings we can assess the alternative strategy of fighting discounters as it 
was initiated 6 years ago by Tesco. Tesco introduced a “fourth” tier of discount brands that are 
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targeted to discounters’ shoppers (Financial Times 2008). They price this new tier of brands 
between economy and standard PL offerings. According to Tesco, this strategy helped them to 
retain their customers (Planet Retail 2010). Indeed, we also find that this introduction can help 
traditional retailers to combat with discounters although it hurts traditional retailers’ existing 
offerings when we only consider the price effects31. However, new products do not include the 
Tesco name, but carry own branded products like All About Shine and Trattoria. Our model does 
not include the effect of using “pseudo names” instead of “retailer name”. Therefore, more research 
is needed to study this strategy. 
Fourth, traditional retailers have recently been trying to find alternative ways to stop 
discounters’ growth. Sainsbury’s recently relaunched Netto as its own discount chain. “If you can’t 
beat them, join them” (The Telegraph 2016). With this strategy, Sainsbury’s tries to keep its image 
of antithesis of discounting, and it avoids to pollute its own Sainsbury’s brand by not changing its 
price and still putting emphasis on quality. However, very recently Sainsbury’s announced that it 
will stop its partnership with Netto. The jury is therefore still out on whether teaming up with 
discounters could help traditional retailers instead of fighting. It would be interesting to study this 
in future research.  
Fifth, in-store and out-of-store promotional activities like display, feature and advertising, 
are likely to influence retailer and/or brand choice. Future research should extent the demand 
model with these potential drivers of consumer demand. 
                                                 
31 To test the effect of this action on market shares of the incumbent players, we hypothetically introduce this new 
fourth tier in each traditional retailers’ assortment (e.g. Tesco discount brand, Asda discount brand, Tesco Extra 
discount brand, Sainsbury’s discount brand and Morrison’s discount brand). This results in 5 extra alternatives in 
consumers’ choice set31. Hence, now consumers face with 53 brand-retailer combinations instead of 48 for the soup 
category and 55 brand-retailer combinations instead of 50 for the cereal category. We find that this introduction 
negatively affects economy PLs (0.3 percentage points), standard PLs (0.9 percentage points) and NBs (2.6 percentage 
points) of traditional retailers as well as discounters’ PLs (0.1 percentage points) (results are not shown in table 7).  
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Finally, we do not consider the cross-category effects due to limited data. Stealing market 
share from discounters in one category might spillover to other categories – a topic that we leave 
for future study. 
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Appendix 
Table 3-8 Retailer-specific own- and cross-price elasticity matrix for canned soup category 
 Traditional Retailers' Economy PLs Traditional Retailers' Standard PLs Discounters' PLs 
 
Asda 
Economy 
PL 
Morrisons 
Economy 
PL 
Sainsbury’s 
Economy 
PL 
Tesco 
Economy 
PL 
TescoExtra 
Economy 
PL 
Asda 
Standard 
PL 
Morrisons 
Standard 
PL 
Sainsbury’s 
Standard 
PL 
Tesco 
Standard 
PL 
TescoExtra 
Standard 
PL 
Aldi PL Lidl PL 
Choice shares (benchmark setting) 
 
1.10% 0.31% 0.94% 0.45% 0.36% 3.17% 1.04% 2.58% 2.46% 1.70% 2.51% 2.91% 
             
Traditional Retailers' Scenarios: 
Drop Asda 
economy PLs 
(-)1.10 (+)0.02 (+)0.06 (+)0.03 (+)0.03 (+)0.30 (+)0.0 (+)0.02 (+)0.05 (+)0.02 (+)0.01 (+)0.01 
Drop 
Morrisons 
economy PLs 
(+)0.06 (-)0.31 (+)0.05 (+)0.03 (+)0.03 (+)0.05 (+)0.04 (+)0.02 (+)0.04 (+)0.02 (+)0.01 (+)0.01 
Drop 
Sainsbury's 
economy PLs 
(+)0.06 (+)0.02 (-)0.94 (+)0.03 (+)0.03 (+)0.06 (+)0.0 (+)0.23 (+)0.05 (+)0.02 (+)0.01 (+)0.02 
Drop Tesco 
economy PLs 
(+)0.06 (+)0.02 (+)0.05 (-)0.45 (+)0.03 (+)0.05 (+)0.0 (+)0.02 (+)0.14 (+)0.02 (+)0.01 (+)0.01 
Drop 
TescoExtra 
economy PLs 
(+)0.06 (+)0.02 (+)0.05 (+)0.03 (-)0.49 (+)0.05 (+)0.0 (+)0.02 (+)0.02 (+)0.20 (+)0.01 (+)0.01 
             
Discounters' Scenarios: 
Drop Aldi PL (+)0.08 (+)0.03 (+)0.08 (+)0.04 (+)0.04 (+)0.09 (+)0.02 (+)0.07 (+)0.09 (+)0.06 (-)2.51 (+)0.09 
Drop Lidl PL (+)0.07 (+)0.03 (+)0.08 (+)0.04 (+)0.04 (+)0.09 (+)0.02 (+)0.06 (+)0.08 (+)0.05 (+)0.06 (-)2.91 
Note: This table shows that if economy PLs of the individual retailers or discounter PLs is dropped, which products do attract the lost share. Choice shares 
(benchmark setting) are expressed as percentages. Outcomes of the counterfactuals are expressed as percentage point changes relative to the benchmark 
setting. 
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Chapter 4  Do Consumers Benefit from an Economy and Premium 
PL Introduction? Evidence from the U.K. 
4.1 Introduction  
The popularity of private labels (PLs) keeps growing in developed regions like Europe, North 
America and Australia (Nielsen 2014). Especially in Europe, PLs account for $1 of every $3 spent 
in the consumer-packaged goods (CPG) market. Switzerland has the highest PL share (in Europe 
and around the world) at 45%, followed closely by the U.K. and Spain at 41% each (Nielsen 2014). 
PLs play an important role in the European food retailing with their three-tier (‘cheap’, ‘good’ and 
‘better’) form. Retailers are increasingly using them as a strategic tool to retain and expand 
customer demand, to improve the image, and to achieve a unique position (Haas and Weawer 
2010). In fact, over the last decade, many retailers already introduced economy and premium PLs 
in their assortment next to the standard PL tier (PWC 2011). Economy PL introduction gained 
popularity among the traditional retailers particularly since retailers assume that economy PLs are 
a good defense mechanism against discounters (Vroegrijk et al. 2016). Retailers differentiate their 
economy PLs from the standard PL offerings by emphasizing their low price and acceptable-
quality level (Dekimpe et al. 2011; Steenkamp and Kumar 2009). Similarly, retailers continuously 
introduce premium PL tiers which offer high quality products, and differentiate themselves from 
national brands (NBs). Retailers especially use them to engender store loyalty, and price them 
comparably with brand leaders (Ezrachi and Ahuya 2009; PLMA 2011).  
The growing importance of the economy and premium PLs has recently been recognized 
as being of great managerial (S4RB 2016; IRI 2014; IPLS 2015) and also academic interest. 
Geyskens et al. (2010) investigate the sales effect of the introduction of economy and premium 
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PLs on incumbent brands. Vroegrijk et al. (2016) concentrate on the role of economy PLs on the 
retailers’ fight with hard discounters. Keller et al. (2017) study the different brand name strategies 
of the economy PLs on the retailers’ performance. Moreover, Ter Braak et al. (2014) study the 
category drivers of premium PL introduction. Gielens (2012) studies the impact of PL and NB 
introductions on category sales and the share of the top-3 NBs and the three PL tiers. Dawes and 
Nenycz-Thiel (2013) study the intensity of PL competition across retailers. Furthermore, Hökelekli 
et al. (2017) explore the impact of PL proliferation by looking at line extension/delisting, and its 
implications for consumer demand and profitability. Finally, Hökelekli et al. (2017) compare the 
effectiveness of three types of PLs (economy PLs versus standard PLs versus premium PLs) 
offered by traditional retailers to fight discounters. In short, all these studies investigate the drivers 
and performance (sales) implications of the economy and premium PLs either for retailer or 
manufacturer focus. In contrast to these previous studies, this paper aims to evaluate the effect of 
economy and premium PL introductions from a consumers’ perspective. More specifically, the 
focus is the consumer welfare implications of the economy and premium PL introductions. 
Therefore, the main research questions are: How do a retailer’s PL tier introductions (i.e. economy 
and premium PL) at traditional retailers affect consumer welfare? Do consumers benefit from 
being able to buy an additional PL tier at a retailer, or do retailers use the introduction of economy 
and premium PL tiers to raise the prices of their current PL offerings (i.e. standard PLs), and are 
they in the process making consumers worse off? 
While popularity of PLs keeps growing, the past decade has seen growing antitrust 
concerns about the impact of PLs on consumer welfare and competition in the grocery sector 
(Daskalova 2012). In fact, competition authorities in Europe increasingly raise their concerns 
around the effect of recent PL tier introductions on consumer welfare. As retailers control the price 
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difference between their PLs and the NBs as a final seller, they therefore can manipulate the prices 
and the perceived value of goods, to benefit their PLs (Ezrachi and Ahuya 2009). For instance, in 
2012, the leading Parisian supermarket Casino overpriced the NBs compared to other retailers, but 
priced its PLs competitively (Berasategi 2014). The French Competition Authority concluded that 
this practice restricts consumers’ freedom of choice as well as market competition. In addition to 
NB pricing, retailers have full control over pricing of PLs. PLs differ in size, nature and quality 
between supermarket chains which makes it difficult for consumers to engage in price comparison. 
This reduced transparency tends to soften price competition between the PLs of different retail 
chains and eventually harms consumer welfare (UK Competition Commission Grocery Market 
Inquiry 2008). Hence, considering the competition authorities’ welfare concerns and the recent 
calls for more consumer welfare-oriented research by industry observers (Hyman et al. 2010), this 
study aims to shed light on the effect of PL tier introductions on consumer welfare. 
Consumer Welfare Effect of Economy and Premium PL Introductions 
Consumers can be affected by new product introductions in two ways. First, they gain surplus 
through the impact of an additional variety that is offered by retailers which is called the ‘variety 
effect’. The degree of the variety effect depends on the possible substitution between the newly 
introduced brand and incumbent brands. For instance, if a new brand is closer to existing brands 
in retailer’s assortment, then it will add less to consumer surplus (Hausman and Leonard 2002). 
Second, consumers’ welfare can be affected through the impact of increased or reduced 
competition in the market which is called the ‘price effect’. This effect can be positive or negative 
depending on retailers’ pre-and post-introduction market behaviour (Arnade et al. 2011). This 
setting is a specific situation where retailers have the final say over the prices of all products in the 
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market. In this case, if the retailer didn’t have any PLs in the market, the introduction of a new PL 
tier increases competition, leading to lower prices and an increase in consumer surplus. However, 
if the retailer already serves the market through existing PLs, the retailer may increase the 
incumbent PL prices strategically, which would implicate a consumer welfare loss (Hausman and 
Leonard 2002). Therefore, the total consumer welfare effect depends on the relative strength of 
these forces. In this paper, since retailers have already been serving the market with their standard 
PL tier, the purpose is to analyse the net benefit of an economy and premium PL tier introduction 
for the consumers. The timing and the order of the new PL tier introductions are consistent across 
retailers in U.K. market. First, retailers introduced economy PLs next to their existing standard PL 
tier. Hence, this study analyses the impact of economy PL introduction on consumer welfare when 
the standard PLs and NBs are the incumbent products. Second, retailers followed the economy PL 
introduction with the introduction of premium PLs. Thus, the second welfare analysis is conducted 
for the premium PL at the backdrop of standard and economy PLs being well-established in the 
market. 
Table 4-7 (see appendix) gives an overview of the previous literature on the impact of brand 
introductions on consumer welfare. Previous literature on consumer welfare focuses on either 
retailer entry or brand introductions at retailers. Hausman and Leibtag (2007) analyse the Wal-
Mart entry and find that consumers not only benefit from the increased variety through the 
increased store choice but also enjoy the lower price of Wall-Mart. Hausman and Leonard (2002) 
study the impact of NBs at the retailers and find that consumers are better off due to increased 
variety as well as cheaper prices. Moreover, Lin et al. (2012) study the impact of NB introductions 
at hard discounters. They find that, in general, NB introductions are welfare enhancing which is 
mainly due to additional variety effect. Total welfare increases because consumers appreciate the 
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new NB variety in discounters’ assortment which previously very limited due to their ‘PL only 
focus’. Finally, Bonfrer and Chintagunta (2004) and Pauwels and Srinivasan (2004) study the 
welfare impact of PL introductions in retailers. The latter find that consumers benefit from lower 
prices through increased competition as well as enjoy more variety since NB manufacturers react 
PL introduction by introducing more product variants. However, both studies only focus on the 
middle tier which is standard PLs. However, this study focuses on the two other tiers which are 
economy and premium PLs, and aims to provide a complete picture of the effect of PL tier 
introductions on consumer welfare. 
Price Effect 
By changing the competitive structure of the industry, the new tier introduction can lead to either 
an increase or decrease in the prices of existing tiers/brands. For the economy PL introduction, the 
natural question is what will be the price effect of this introduction on retailer’s existing tiers. 
Economic theory predicts that if the new tier competes closely with the existing tiers of the same 
manufacturer, the manufacturer may be able to raise the price of its existing brands (Hausman 
1997). Hence, the retailer can increase the price of standard PLs. Similarly, the compromise effect 
predicts that as a result of the introduction of the economy PL, standard PLs will increase in utility 
and, therefore, their relative choice probability increases since they become a compromise or 
middle option in the assortment (see also Geyskens et al. 2010). In the end, standard PLs become 
more appealing for the consumers who are often uncertain about the product quality and have the 
tendency to choose the middle option (Geyskens et. al 2010; Wernerfelt 1995). Therefore, in this 
case, retailer can use economy PL introduction as an opportunity to increase the price of its existing 
standard PL tier.  
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On the other hand, an economy PL introduction at a retailer may also lead to a decrease in 
the prices of the incumbent standard PLs since this introduction creates increased inter-tier 
competition (e.g. Besanko and Braeutigam 2002). When the new tier takes away sales from the 
incumbent products, the retailer may react by decreasing the price of existing tiers (Lin et al. 2012). 
In this case, it would be expected that the prices of the standard PL offerings may drop. 
Furthermore, either brand manufacturer or retailer (as a final seller of NBs) can use the economy 
PL introduction to increase the prices of NBs. Thanks to introduction of a lower quality option 
(i.e. economy PL) in the retailer, NBs become a compromise or middle option in terms of quality 
in the retailer’s assortment (Geyskens et al. 2010). Therefore, NBs can be even more appealing for 
the consumers who are ready to pay a price premium for a better-quality product.  
For the premium PL introduction, the main question is what will be the price effect of this 
introduction on retailer’s economy and standard PLs as well as NBs. A premium PL introduction 
can result in a price increase for the retailer’s existing PL offerings. Premium PLs are more 
expensive than the standard and economy PLs of the retailers. Consumers generally remember 
higher prices and set their references accordingly (Steiner 1973; Kanetkar, Weinberg and Weiss 
1992). Hence, retailers may use this consumer behaviour hint as an opportunity to raise the current 
PL prices. As a result, consumers are worse off since they have to pay higher prices for the 
incumbent PLs.  
In contrast, economic theory predicts that this new tier increases the competition among 
PLs (Besanko and Braeutigam 2002). Since the premium PLs take away some sales from the 
existing brands, retailers may decrease the current tiers’ prices (e.g. economy and standard PLs). 
Moreover, with this new three-tier PL offerings, retailers act more strategically and may try to 
segment their customers according to their price sensitivity (Bridge Strategy 2017). By lowering 
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their economy and/or standard PLs’ prices they can target price conscious customers and with the 
new premium PL tier, they can target price insensitive customers. In addition to this, this strategy 
also benefits customers since they are able to buy the existing products at lower prices, thus 
enhancing consumer welfare. 
In terms of the effect of premium PL introduction on NB prices, two effects are at play. 
The competition effect predicts that if a new tier competes more closely with certain products, the 
prices of these products are likely to fall. In this case, one can expect that sales of NBs will be 
affected most, as they are characterised by a similar quality, and by consequence it is likely NB 
manufacturers will react by lowering their prices. Previous empirical research indeed confirmed 
that the introduction of standard PL leads to lower NB prices (Chintagunta et al. 2002). The second 
effect is the brand image effect, which highlights the importance of the ‘brand addiction’ of 
consumers. Following the entry of a premium PL, the retailer or brand manufacturers may increase 
NB prices by emphasizing the “better quality NB image (Gabrielsen and Sørgard 2007). 
Variety Effect 
Most researchers agree that consumers prefer more variety when given a choice (Brynjolfsson et 
al. 2003; Kahn and Lehman 1991; Baumol and Ide 1956). Therefore, an additional PL tier in 
retailers’ assortment would be appreciated by consumers. Moreover, these new introductions fill 
certain gaps in the market instead of copying or replacing NBs, e.g. offer acceptable basic quality 
at lower price (i.e. economy PLs) or innovative and better products at a comparable NB price (i.e. 
premium PLs). Consequently, the introductions may satisfy the consumer needs in a more 
convenient way and be welfare enhancing (Sorescu and Spanjol 2008). Finally, one would expect 
that the variety effect for the economy PL introduction is stronger than the premium PL 
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introduction. When an economy PL is introduced in a market where no similar products are 
available, the perceived variety is expected to increase considerably, since a new differentiating 
attribute is brought into play (Van Herpen and Pieters 2002). In this case, a new differentiating 
attribute is “lower quality-no frills product” which makes the economy PLs unique in the market. 
However, premium PLs do not fill a pre-existing quality gap in the market.  
On the other hand, there is a large stream of research that shows ‘more is not always better’, 
stressing that consumers don’t necessarily prefer more variety (Iyengar and Lepper 2000). When 
there is excess choice, consumers are more likely to buy nothing at all, and if they do buy, they are 
less satisfied with their selection (Harvard Business Review 2006). Moreover, more choice 
requires more time and effort to spend (i.e. search cost), hence eventually each new option can 
make consumers feel worse off than before. These new PL introductions may create choice 
overload in the eyes of consumers. Hence, consumer welfare can be worse off if they look for 
simplicity with a reasonable assortment. 
To sum, an introduction of an economy and premium PL in retailers can be beneficial or 
detrimental for the consumers. Since the net consumer welfare effect depends on the relative 
strength of these effects, one needs to conduct a welfare analysis to find out the answer. The 
remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I provide a description of the 
data and a brief overview of the industry. In section 4.3, I explain the proposed research method. 
Section 4.4 explains the empirical setting and the steps to calculate consumer welfare. Section 4.5 
discusses the study’s empirical results and finally in section 4.6, I conclude with a discussion and 
special attention for the limitations of my research. 
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4.2 Research Setting  
To study the consumer welfare implications of the economy and premium PL introductions, the 
study uses the U.K. household panel data from Kantar Worldpanel32. This panel data consists of 
the purchase records of representative households that shop in the ready to eat cereal (RTE) and 
canned soup categories across all retailers. The data cover the period from January 1993 until July 
1997 for the cereal category and from January 1998 until December 2002 for the soup category. 
The advantage of this data over other data sets used in consumer welfare studies, is that retailer 
level information is also readily available. Hence, change in consumer welfare due to the economy 
or premium PL introductions in U.K.’s top leading retailers can be separately analysed.  
The UK retail market is one of the pioneers of PL tier introductions in Europe and PLs 
account 50% of the U.K. retailer sales, which makes it one of the highest in Europe (Nielsen, 
2014). The U.K. market is dominated by four large retailers that account for around 75% of the 
total grocery market, whereas top five manufacturers only represent 10.8% of the market (PWC 
2011). As a result of this high retail concentration and equally high market power, the market is 
fiercely competitive as each retailer develops its own unique point of difference by introducing PL 
tiers in an attempt to attract new customers and entice existing customers to spend more (Bord Bia, 
2010).  
I select the cereal category for the economy PL tier introduction, and the soup category for 
the premium PL introduction. The chosen categories give a good set-up for the welfare analysis 
since the timing of the introductions by the retailers are very close (see Table 4-1 and Table 4-2). 
Both categories enjoy high penetration of PL-tier introduction in the retailing markets. Secondly, 
                                                 
32 The Kantar Worldpanel data was obtained through AiMark. 
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these categories are concentrated with leading NBs and other following PLs so that the competition 
between PLs and NBs are more strategic. Finally, manufacturers and retailers are competing with 
each other by introducing varieties of products in flavours, packaging, and even labelling strategies 
(Ying and Anders, 2013). Therefore, these categories are suitable to the analysis of consumer 
reaction of new brand introductions. Before the economy and premium PL tier introductions, 
retailers have been offering NBs as well as their standard PLs. In terms of PL tier introduction 
timing, retailers first introduced their economy PL options next to their standard PL offerings in 
early 90s in U.K. market. After that, they introduced their premium PL options at the beginning of 
2000. For the economy PL introduction in the cereal category, Asda, Sainsbury’s, Safeway and 
Somerfield are selected. For the premium PL introduction in the soup category, Asda, Sainsbury’s 
and Safeway are selected since these retailers are the first ones to introduce the premium PL tier, 
with a similar timing of the introductions33.  
For the analysis34, household level data on purchases are aggregated into weekly 
observations for each retailer. The retailer level data are the sum of individual household’ 
quantities and expenditures for each brand35. For each retailer, top NBs are chosen based on their 
average market share which is above 0.5% cut off point, measured as a proportion of total 
purchases over sample period. All retailers have the same top existing brands that allows 
consistency for the analysis. In addition to NBs, for the economy PL introduction in the cereal 
category, standard PL is also included for the analysis as in that time no premium PL tier is 
introduced. Whereas for the premium PL introduction analysis in the soup category, in addition to 
                                                 
33 Other big retailers (e.g. Tesco, Morrisons and Somerfield) introduced the premium PL tier in the soup category in 
2007 (which is much later than the selected retailers’ timing). 
34 The analysis was done by using the data in post introduction period.  
35 The SKU level data is aggregated to the brand level. 
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top NBs and standard PL tier, also economy PL tier is included since economy PL tier introduction 
happened much before the premium PL introduction across retailers. In the soup category, top NBs 
are Campbells, Heinz, Weight Watchers, Baxters while in the cereal category, top NBs are Alpen, 
Nestle, Kellogg’s, Weetabix. 
Table 4-1 Average value share of top existing brands and Economy PL in pre- and post-introduction periods 
(cereal)  
Retailer Asda Sainsbury's Safeway Somerfield 
Period Before After Before After Before After Before After 
 May 1995 Sep 1995 Nov 1994 Jan 1995 
Alpen 0.017 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.023 0.031 0.019 
Nestle 0.077 0.114 0.094 0.139 0.104 0.129 0.118 0.117 
Kellogg’s 0.589 0.520 0.425 0.393 0.586 0.488 0.700 0.620 
Weetabix 0.106 0.112 0.088 0.090 0.084 0.095 0.094 0.099 
Standard PL 0.211 0.213 0.377 0.350 0.210 0.250 0.074 0.134 
Economy PL N. A. 0.023 N. A. 0.011 N. A. 0.015 N. A. 0.015 
# of households 2484 3416 2094 811 
Table 4-2 Average value share of top existing brands and Premium PL in pre- and post-introduction periods (soup)  
Retailer Asda Sainsbury's Safeway 
Period Before After Before After Before After 
  Jun-2001 May-1999 Dec-2000 
Alpen 0.100 0.064 0.125 0.121 0.137 0.14 
Nestle 0.481 0.520 0.427 0.468 0.548 0.580 
Kellogg’s 0.038 0.062 0.046 0.049 0.053 0.065 
Weetabix 0.059 0.085 0.102 0.095 0.105 0.096 
Standard PL 0.258 0.219 0.286 0.191 0.133 0.101 
Economy PL 0.063 0.047 0.015 0.026 0.024 0.012 
Premium PL N. A. 0.008 N. A. 0.052 N. A. 0.011 
# of households 4152 3115 2783 
 
 Table 4-1 and Table 4-2 present the number of unique households in the panel that shop 
in the selected retailers as well as the average value shares of the existing brands and the new PL 
tiers in the pre- and post-introduction periods for each category. The cumulative number of 
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households ranges from 811 (Somerfield) to 3416 (Sainsbury’s) in the cereal category and from 
2783 (Safeway) to 4152 (Asda) in the soup category. The value share of the existing brand ranges 
from 70% for Kellogg’s in Safeway to 1.6% for Alpen in Sainsbury’s in the cereal category and 
ranges from 58% for Heinz in Safeway to 1.2% for Economy PL in Safeway in the soup category. 
4.3 Research Method 
Since the objective is to quantify the change in consumer welfare due to economy or premium PL 
introduction, the monetary value of this change should be defined first. Compensating variation 
(hereafter CV) can be used to quantify the effect of an introduction on consumers’ net welfare 
(Hausman and Leonard 2002; Arnade et al. 2011). CV is the difference in the consumers’ 
expenditure with and without the economy and premium PL available, such that the consumer 
utility level remains unchanged. Utility is kept constant in the post introduction period as to isolate 
the change in welfare induced by the new PL tier introduction. In other words, CV is the change 
in welfare (expressed in consumers’ expenditure) with and without the new PL tier available in 
retailer’s assortment. It can be written as: 
 𝐶𝑉 = ∆ 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 = 𝐸(𝑝𝑖
0, 𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑤
∗ , ?̅?) − 𝐸(𝑝𝑖
1, 𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑤 , ?̅?) 
                                                                      without PL tier          with PL tier 
                                                                                     introduction              introduction 
(20) 
 
where 𝑝𝑖
1 is the vector of incumbent brands’ prices when the new PL tier is present.  𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑤 is the 
price of the newly introduced PL tier at the retailer. 𝑝𝑖
0 is the price vector of incumbent brands 
when the new PL tier is absent, and 𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑤
∗  denotes the “virtual price” of the economy or premium 
PL at which demand for the economy or premium PL would be zero given the prices of the 
incumbents. In other words, the virtual price refers to the hypothetical price of economy or 
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premium PL that makes the demand zero as if this product doesn’t exist. While the first term 
captures the virtual expenditures, the second term captures the actual expenditures when the new 
PL tier is present. Note that in both terms, consumer utility is held constant (?̅?) at post introduction 
level which allows us to capture the change in consumer welfare due to new PL tier introduction. 
This total change in consumer welfare can be separated into two parts: variety effect (VE) and 
price effect (PE), CV can thus be rewritten as (Hausman and Leonard 2002): 
 𝐶𝑉 = [𝑒(𝑝𝑖
1, 𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑤
∗ , ?̅?) − 𝑒(𝑝𝑖
1, 𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑤, ?̅?)]+ [𝑒(𝑝𝑖
1, 𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑤
∗ , ?̅?) − 𝑒(𝑝𝑖
0, 𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑤
∗ , ?̅?)] (21) 
                                                       Variety effect                                              Price effect 
The first term in equation (21) represents the variety effect. The first expenditure function in the 
variety effect contains the hypothetical (or counterfactual) expenditures in case the new PL tier 
consumption is zero in the post-introduction period. The second expenditure function in the variety 
effect denotes the actual (observed) expenditure in the post-introduction period when all the 
incumbent brands’ prices (𝑝𝑖
1) and the new PL tier’s price are observed (𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑤). The first part in 
the variety effect ends up with a higher expenditure than the second part since the virtual price of 
the new PL tier should be high enough to make demand zero and as a result, the reallocation of 
demand to incumbent brands leads to higher expenditures than the actual expenditure.  
The second term in the CV equation represents the price effect which is the difference in 
category expenditures due to only the price change of the incumbent brands (𝑝𝑖
1 and 𝑝𝑖
0). The price 
of the new PL tier is each time set at its virtual price (𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑤
∗ ) to reflect its absence. This price effect 
can be either positive or negative. In the end, the CV equation can be written as 𝐶𝑉 = (𝑉𝐸 + 𝑃𝐸).  
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4.4 Empirical Setting 
Consumer Welfare Calculation 
In order to calculate the CV as it is discussed in the previous section, one should calculate the 
related expenditure functions in equation (21). Following Hausman (1981), the total welfare effect 
(CV) can be derived from the expenditure functions as (see also Lin et al. 2012; Hausman and 
Leonard 2002): 
               𝐶𝑉 =
1
1+𝛿
[𝑃(𝑝𝑖
0, 𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑤
∗ ) ∗ 𝑄(𝑝𝑖
0, 𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑤
∗ ) − 𝑃(𝑝𝑖
1, 𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑤) ∗ 𝑄(𝑝𝑖
1, 𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑤)]. (22) 
                                         (i)                            (ii)                                                   (iii) 
CV then can be calculated by solving the subparts of equation (22). Part (iii) represents the actual 
(observed) category expenditures, and can be computed using the observed prices in the post-
introduction period, 𝑝𝑖
1 and  𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑤. However, to find the values of the parameters in part (i) and 
part (ii), demand estimation methods are required.  
Part (i) can be quantified with the estimation of the category price elasticity 𝛿. Following 
Gorman’s two stage budgeting approach (Gorman 1995; Hausman and Leonard 2002), the top-
level demand equation corresponds to overall demand for the soup and cereal category is estimated 
to obtain overall category level price elasticities. For this, I estimate the following log-log category 
demand model (see Besanko and Braeutigam 2002; Hausman and Leonard 2002): 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑄𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼𝑟 + 𝛿𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑡 + 𝜑𝑍𝑡 + 𝜀𝑟𝑡 , (23) 
where 𝑄𝑟𝑡 is overall category quantity (in volume) in retailer 𝑟 in week 𝑡, 𝛼𝑟 is a fixed effect for 
retailer 𝑟, 𝑃𝑟𝑡 is the category level price index at retailer. 𝑍𝑡 is a vector of control variables which 
includes a Christmas dummy, seasonal dummies (e.g. winter, summer) and a time trend. Seasonal 
dummies are included in the model to capture the higher (or lower) consumption due to seasonal 
conditions. For example, one could expect a higher demand for the soup category during cold 
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times of the year. In addition to the winter dummy, Christmas dummy is also added in the model 
which equals one for the week prior to Christmas, in order to capture the New Years’ shopping 
period which is independent from the winter effect. Finally,  𝜀𝑟𝑡 denotes an error which is assumed 
to be i.i.d. normal. Stone index is used to capture the aggregate category level price at the retailer: 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑡 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑡
𝐼
𝑖=1 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑡 , (24) 
where 𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑡 is the category value share of each brand 𝑖 within retailer 𝑟 at time 𝑡.  
Part (ii) in equation (22) represents the virtual category expenditures. To estimate virtual 
category expenditures, prices of the incumbent brands 𝑝𝑖
0 and the virtual price of newly introduced 
PL tier should be calculated. Since pre-introduction data is observed in this study, prices of the 
incumbent brands prices 𝑝𝑖
0 are ready to use. However, the virtual price of newly introduced PL 
tier still needs to be calculated. To do this, I estimate a second level detailed demand system which 
determines the buying behaviour with respect to brands conditional on total category expenditure 
within the soup and cereal categories. For this level, a flexible demand specification, which is an 
almost ideal demand system36 (AIDS), is estimated (see Deaton and Muelbauer 1981). 
 
𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑟 + 𝜆𝑖 ln (
𝐸𝑟𝑡
𝑃𝑟𝑡
) + 𝛽𝑖𝑖 ln(𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑡) + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗 ln(𝑃𝑗𝑟𝑡) + 𝜑𝑍𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1
 (25) 
𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑅                      𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇                   𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐼                   j=1,…, J 
where 𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑡 is the expenditure share of the brand 𝑖 in retailer 𝑟 and week 𝑡, 𝑃𝑗𝑟𝑡 is the price of the 
competing brands 𝑗 in retailer 𝑟 and week 𝑡, 𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑡 denotes the price of the brand i (in this case 
representing either economy PL or premium PL), 𝑃𝑟𝑡 is the price index (derived in equation (24)). 
                                                 
36 The AIDS specification is a first approximation to any demand system. This implies that even if the true underlying 
demand system is not AIDS, AIDS will nevertheless provide a sufficiently accurate approximation at any set of prices 
not too far from the point of approximation (Hausman and Leonard 2005). 
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𝐸𝑟𝑡 is the total expenditure on category in retailer 𝑟 and week 𝑡, 𝛼𝑖𝑟 denotes the retailer-brand fixed 
effects to capture the time invariant characteristics. Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑡 is an error term and 𝑍𝑡 captures 
the control variables as before. 
Virtual Prices 
Given the estimates in equation (25) for the ith brand (i.e. economy PL or premium PL), one can 
solve for the virtual price of the same brand by calculating the own price elasticities. Then, these 
estimated elasticities can be used to project virtual prices (Arnade et al. 2011). The virtual prices 
that are calculated by using the elasticity approach gives more reliable price values compared to 
the approach of Hausman and Leonard (2002). For example, if the own price elasticity of demand 
for a new PL tier is -2 (-2.5), then increasing the prices by 50% (40%) will force quantity demanded 
to zero, all else constant. However, as the previous literature also stated, it is highly expected that 
the Hausman and Leonard (2002) approach can generate estimates with large variance and some 
prices can be four or five times the observed new price in the post introduction period (see 
appendix for details). 
In the end, from equation (22), the total welfare effect is calculated which includes both 
the price and variety effect. To identify the consumer welfare effect due to the variety effect, the 
following equation is estimated (see Lin et al. 2012): 
 𝑉𝐸 =
1
1+𝛿
[𝑃(𝑝𝑖
1, 𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑤
∗ ) ∗ 𝑄(𝑝𝑖
1, 𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑤
∗ ) − 𝑃(𝑝𝑖
1, 𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑤) ∗ 𝑄(𝑝𝑖
1, 𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑤)] . (26) 
After this estimation, PE can be found by subtracting the VE from CV. 
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4.5 Empirical Results 
To calculate the CV, the first top-level demand system is estimated for both categories 
(equation 4). Results are reported in Table 4-3 for both categories. Because a log-log specification 
is used, the estimated coefficient on the log price represents the category price elasticity. To 
estimate this top-level demand equation, pooled OLS is used by controlling the retailer differences 
with retailer fixed effects together with other control variables37.  
Table 4-3 Top Level demand estimation 
 
                                                 
37 In line with the marketing literature, Christmas dummy and season dummies are added to the model (Lin et al. 
2012). Especially, in the soup category, these seasonal dummies indicate that there is higher demand for soup in winter 
compared to summer months. As a robustness check, instead of these control variables, weekly dummies are added to 
the model but they also revealed the same insights. Moreover, as a sensitivity check, top level demand is separately 
estimated for each retailer to see whether the category price elasticity differ across retailers. However, parameter 
estimates reveal similar magnitude and signs. 
Category Cereal Soup 
lnPt -0.776 *** -0.530 *** 
 (0.03)  (0.05)  
Trend 1.59E-05  -0.000174  
 (0.00034)  (0.00013)  
Christmas -0.537 *** -0.517 *** 
 (0.013)  (0.042)  
Spring -0.0200 *** 0.306 *** 
 (0.005)  -0.015  
Fall -0.00454  0.567 *** 
 (0.005)  (0.015)  
Winter -0.0757 *** 0.806 *** 
 (0.005)  (0.016)  
Constant 6.933 *** -2.813 *** 
 (0.19)  (0.416)  
Retailer Intercepts yes  yes  
Observations 4,865  3,007  
Adjusted R-squared 0.936  0.773  
Prob >F 0  0  
Standard errors in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The results indicate that the category level price is highly inelastic both in the cereal category (𝛽 =
−0.77, p<0.01) and in the soup category (𝛽 = −0.53, p<0.01). 
Then as a second step, the AIDS model is estimated to derive the virtual prices for the 
economy and premium PLs (see Table 4-4). Here, note that AIDS model is estimated without 
imposing any restrictions on demand model. Hence, instead of estimating each share equation for 
each brand, I only estimate the share equation for the economy PL and premium PL in the cereal 
and soup category respectively. This approach is in line with the rest of the marketing literature 
that supports the rejection of homogeneity and symmetry restrictions (e.g. Deaton 1986, Hausman 
and Leonard 2002, Lin et al. 2012). In addition to this, marketing literature also shows that the 
cross effects of NBs ad PLs tend to be asymmetric (e.g. Hökelekli et al. 2017; Allenby and Rossi 
1991; Blattberg and Wisniewski 1989). 
The left half of the Table 4-4 shows the share equation estimates for the economy PL in 
the cereal category. All the price coefficients of the competing brands have significant and 
expected positive signs38. For instance, the effect of a price increase of the competing brands such 
as 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝐴𝑙𝑝𝑒𝑛) and 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝐾𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑠)  on the value share of economy PL is positive (𝛽 = 0.00408, p<0.05; 
𝛽 = 0.00692, p<0.05), meaning that when the competing brands’ price is increased, the demand 
for economy PL increases. In the soup category, although the effect of price of the competing 
brands on the value share of premium PL is positive, the effect is only significant for Heinz. For 
example, the effect of the price increase of 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝐻𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑧) on the value share of premium PL in the soup 
category is positive (𝛽 = 0.0336, p<0.1). 
                                                 
38 As a robustness check, AIDS model is estimated separately for each retailer. Although some of the competing brand 
price coefficients turn out to be insignificant and different than pooled model results due to limited observations in 
some retailers (e.g. Somerfield and Safeway), however the coefficient on economy and premium PL remained 
relatively similar in terms of sign and magnitude. Since these are the core coefficients to estimate the virtual prices, 
the pooled model was preferred as a final model specification. 
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Table 4-4 AIDS Model Estimates 
 
Value share Economy PL  
in the cereal category 
  Value share Premium PL 
in the soup category 
 (0.002)    (0.028)  
ln_E_P -0.00367 ***  𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑃𝐿) -0.0237 * 
 (0.000)    (0.013)  
    ln_E_P  -0.00513  
     (0.006)  
Trend -4.90e-05 ***  Trend -0.000256 *** 
 (0.000)    (0.000)  
Christmas  -0.00183   Christmas -0.00147  
 (0.001)    (0.015)  
R1 0.0307 ***  R1 -0.0621 *** 
 (0.001)    (0.009)  
R2 -0.00217 *  R2 -0.0500 *** 
 (0.001)    (0.009)  
R3 0.0019      
 (0.001)      
Spring 2.38E-05   Spring 0.00257  
 (0.000)    (0.005)  
Fall 0.000336   Fall -0.00349  
 (0.000)    (0.006)  
Winter -0.000268    Winter 0.0105  
 (0.000)    (0.007)  
Constant 0.229 ***  Constant 0.274  
 (0.021)    (0.321)  
Observations 1,006   Observations 219  
Adjusted R-squared 0.807   Adjusted R-squared 0.504  
F test 399.5   F test 15.76  
Prob >F 0   Prob >F 0  
Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝐴𝑙𝑝𝑒𝑛) 0.00408 ***  𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝐵𝑎𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠) 0.0172  
 (0.001)    (0.026)  
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑁𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑒) 0.00744 ***  𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠) 0.00908  
 (0.001)    (0.031)  
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝐾𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑠) 0.00692 ***  𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝐻𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑧) 0.0336 * 
 (0.001)    (0.0179)  
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑥) 0.00250 *  𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠) -0.029  
 (0.001)    (0.020)  
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 𝑃𝐿) -0.00254 **  𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 𝑃𝐿) 0.00886  
 (0.000)    (0.012)  
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑃𝐿) 0.00837 ***  𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑃𝐿) -0.0126  
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The most relevant parameter estimate is the one for the 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 𝑃𝐿) in the cereal category which 
shows that if the price of economy PLs in retailers increases, the value share of the economy PLs 
within retailers decreases (𝛽 = −0.00254, p<0.05). Similarly, the coefficient estimate for the 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑃𝐿) in the soup category indicates that the value share of premium PL and its price are 
inversely related (𝛽 = −0.0237, p<0.1). Eventually, these parameter estimates are used to 
calculate the virtual price of the economy PL and premium PL across retailers.  
Table 4-5 Descriptive Statistics on Prices (year after the economy and premium PL introduction) 
 
Table 4-5 shows the estimated virtual prices of economy and premium PL tiers across 
retailers. Actual (observed) prices of economy PL tier across retailers are quite comparable (1.04€ 
per kilo on average). Only Asda prices its economy PL tier more expensive than other retailers 
(1.54€ per kilo). Note that this is not the case for the virtual prices. Virtual prices vary considerably 
across retailers. As discussed in the empirical setting section, the elasticity approach was chosen 
to calculate the virtual price for the economy PL (as well as for the premium PL) for each retailer. 
For this, the own price elasticity of demand for the economy PL tier is calculated by using the 
estimated parameters of the AIDS model. Then, this own price elasticity of demand is used to find 
 
 Asda Sainsbury's Safeway Somerfield 
Cereal Stone Index/Kg (€) 3.19 3.00 3.14 3.19 
Actual Economy PL Price/Kg (€) 1.54 1.03 1.04 1.05 
Virtual Economy PL Price/Kg (€) 2.95 1.53 1.54 1.75 
       
Soup Stone Index/Kg (€) 1.14 1.40 1.26 N. A 
Actual Premium PL Price/Kg (€) 1.34 1.51 1.76 N. A 
Virtual Premium PL Price/Kg (€) 1.61 2.56 2.27 N. A 
Note: The price values, which are calculated per week, were found by averaging over the first year following the 
PL tier introductions. 
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out the price level that forces quantity demanded to zero, all else constant39. Moreover, it is 
observed that the price index for the cereal category is higher than the economy PL price across 
retailers. This shows that the price of economy PLs is far lower than the category average. 
If we look at the descriptives on prices in the soup category, it is shown that observed prices 
of the premium PLs differ considerably across retailers. Safeway prices its premium PL range 
higher than Sainsbury’s and Asda. Asda offers its premium PLs cheapest in the market compared 
to other retailers’ premium PLs. Moreover, the price index for the soup category is consistently 
lower than the premium PL prices across retailers. This shows that retailers price their incumbent 
brands well below the premium PL price. Finally, virtual prices of the premium PLs also differ 
across retailers. Virtual prices of the premium PLs are calculated in a similar fashion that is 
explained in the economy PL case (see previous paragraph) by using the elasticity approach. 
After the calculation of the different components of the CV (equation 22), one can quantify 
the effect of PL introductions on consumer welfare. Table 4-6 presents the welfare results due to 
introduction of economy PL in the cereal category and introduction of the premium PL in the soup 
category. Table 4-6 shows the different components of the total welfare effect by distinguishing 
the variety effect, price effect and total effect of per household (HH) in the year after the 
introductions per retailer40. The CV calculation suggests that, on average, the utility gain from 
adding an economy PL tier is worth about 1.71€ to each household over the one-year period. This 
ranges from 1.36€ in Sainsbury’s to 1.98€ in Somerfield.  
                                                 
39 This approach reveals virtual prices that is reasonable closer to the actual values. On the other hand, the calculation 
of virtual prices by using Hausman and Leonard (2002) generates estimates with large variance and some prices can 
be over four or five times the observed new tier price in the post-introduction period (results are shown in the 
appendix).  
40 Welfare effects per household are calculated by dividing the total CV by the number of unique households per 
retailer. 
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Table 4-6 Consumer Welfare Effect for the Year After the PL Introductions across retailers (per household) 
 
To provide a basis for household comparison and to provide a more meaningful metric, the 
household level CV is divided by total expenditure to express this a percentage of expenditure 
(Kim et al. 2002). When CV is expressed as percentage, it corresponds to 2.51% of the category 
consumption across retailers. Ranging from 2.10% in Somerfield to 2.90% in Asda. Similarly, it 
is observed that consumers benefit from premium PL introduction (on average 1.15€ per household 
across retailers). This corresponds to 2.67% of the category consumption across retailers ranging 
from 1.70% in Safeway to 3.50% in Sainsbury’s. Moreover, the results show that there is a 
substantial welfare gain if CV is expressed as yearly total category expenditure per household 
ranging from 50.37€ for the ones who shop in Sainsbury’s to 94.28€ in Somerfield in cereal 
category and from 25.88€ for Safeway shoppers to 48.21€ for Asda shoppers in soup category. 
Consistent with the previous literature, the decomposition of the total consumer-welfare 
effect into price and variety effect shows that the welfare change is mostly driven by the increased 
variety in both PL tier introductions. The positive price values in price effect column indicate that 
consumers benefit from the decrease in prices of the existing brands. Moreover, the per household 
 Compensating Variation (CV) Variety effect Price effect 
 
Per HH 
(€) 
Yearly total 
category 
expenditure per 
HH 
% of yearly total 
category 
expenditure 
Per HH 
(€) 
Per HH 
(€) 
Cereal      
Sainsbury's 1.36 50.37 2.70% 0.86 0.50 
Asda 1.86 64.13 2.90% 1.19 0.67 
Safeway 1.67 71.06 2.35% 1.37 0.30 
Somerfield 1.98 94.28 2.10% 1.42 0.56 
Soup      
Sainsbury's 1.22 34.85 3.10% 0.88 0.34 
Asda 1.35 48.21 2.80% 1.13 0.22 
Safeway 0.88 25.88 3.40% 0.70 0.18 
Somerfield N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A 
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CV is higher in the introduction of economy PL than the case of premium PL introduction. This 
proves that the existence of this low-priced option, which would not necessarily be available in the 
absence of PL, provides more benefit to consumers by compared to premium PLs (Van Herpen 
and Pieters 2002). 
4.6 Discussion and Limitations 
The competition issues related to PLs differ depending on the role and the type of PLs and how 
those compete with NBs or other PLs. In the past, competition authorities have been mainly 
concerned with the consumer welfare impact of the standard PLs. With the increase of PL tier 
offerings by retailers, the topic has gained even more attention (Daskolova 2012). For instance, 
standard PLs act as brand substitutes, but economy and premium PLs may play a complementary 
role – in the sense that they complete a price range (by offering economy or premium price 
alternatives) or a product line. Because they can be complements, the findings and conclusions on 
the competitive or anti-competitive effect of new PL tiers need to be nuanced (Daskolova 2012). 
Low income consumers can be better served with economy PLs, as well as high income consumers 
who are looking for specialty high end products can find premium PLs welfare enhancing. Indeed, 
this study shows that consumers are likely to benefit from new PL tier listings. They both enjoy 
the reduced prices of the incumbent products as well as increased variety thanks to newly available 
options.  
In this study, the focus was consumers. Previous research has already shown that retailers 
are also better off with their PL tier introductions since they mostly enjoy higher margins due to 
better deals with the manufacturers and thus have a lower cost but also due to an increase in store 
loyalty (Steiner 2004; Geyskens et al. 2010; Ter Braak et al. 2014). To check the general popularity 
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change of the retailers after their PL introduction, changes in the overall market share are reported 
in Table 4-9 in appendix. The numbers show that all retailers gained market share after their new 
PL tier introductions, with the exception of Sainsbury’s. Moreover, in line with the expectations, 
Asda became more popular relative to other retailers after the introduction of economy PL since 
the economy PL penetration is highest relative to other retailers. This implies the potential win-
win situation among consumers and retailers. However, brand manufacturers may potentially 
suffer, as the competition increases due to new PL listings next to current standard PLs. Hence, as 
a response to this threat, they might react in a number of ways. One way is to increase their 
presence in discounter format. Since the discounters also suffer from the economy PL 
introductions of the traditional retailers, they will use this counter strategy to team up with brand 
manufactures and create a win-win situation. This strategy has already proven its worth 
(Deleersnyder et al. 2007 and Hökelekli et al. 2017). Moreover, the brand manufacturers might 
invest in innovation and offer more varieties in order to differentiate themselves from the PL 
alternatives (Oxera 2010). To reveal some insights on this, changes in the number of unique NB 
SKUs are calculated for each retailer one year after the economy and premium PL introductions 
by the retailers. Table 4-10 in appendix shows that brand manufacturers react to PL tier 
introductions by increasing their offerings overall, except for the premium PL introduction in 
Safeway. These numbers also show that the degree of the effect is stronger if the retailer introduce 
the PL tier with high penetration. For instance, brand manufactures react Asda’s economy PL 
introduction by increasing the number of SKUs by 50%. Again, this might be driven by the fact 
that economy PL share is higher in Asda relative to other retailers. Similarly, the share of each PL 
tier product on the total product category differs across retailers, e.g. premium PLs are more 
important for Sainsbury’s than for other retailers. As a result, brand manufacturers introduced 37% 
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more options in Sainsbury’s after the premium PL introduction, considerably more than in other 
retailers.  
This study knows some limitations that offer avenues for further research. First, subject to 
data availability, future research can evaluate the welfare implications of the economy and 
premium PL tiers in other categories. This will allow researchers to generalize the findings and 
reach a concrete overall picture of the effect of PL tiers on consumer welfare. 
Second, this study focuses on the additional welfare impact of the PL tiers brings through 
the variety effect. However, retailers might use these introductions to delist some of the brand 
variants from the assortment. Future research should focus on the impact of these possible 
delistings.  
Third, in this study, consumer welfare effects are analysed at the retailer level by using 
aggregate national level data. Since retailers in the U.K. follow a national pricing scheme, 
consumers are faced with same prices in each region. However, future studies may investigate the 
welfare effects by controlling the consumer demographics. In this way, they can quantify the effect 
of PL tier introductions on different consumer segments (Hausman and Leibtag 2007). This is 
especially important in this case since one would assume that the different social classes or income 
holders can be differently affected by the economy and premium PL introductions since the effect 
depends on their respective shopping basket. 
Finally, this study doesn’t control the reactions of the retailers to each other’s PL 
introductions. The strongest competitive constraint on the retailers’ pricing could come from other 
retailers’ pricing decisions on NBs as well as PL tiers. Future studies should also assess the 
spillover effects and investigate the consumer welfare effects due to the retailers’ reactions to each 
other. 
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Appendix  
Table 4-7 Literature overview – impact on consumer welfare 
Virtual Price Calculation by using Hausman and Leonard (2002) approach 
Given the estimates of the equation (25) for the ith brand (i.e. economy PL or premium PL), one 
can solve for the virtual price of the same brand by inverting the share equation (25). After that, 
𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑤
∗  (representing the virtual price of economy and premium PL tier) can be calculated by making 
the consumption (demand) is zero (𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 0) for these tiers in equation (25): 
 
𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑤
∗ = (
?̂?𝑖𝑟 + ∑ ?̂?𝑖𝑗 ln(𝑃𝑗𝑟𝑡) + ?̂?𝑖 ln (
𝐸𝑟𝑡
𝑃𝑟𝑡
)𝐽−1𝑗≠𝑖
−𝛽𝑖𝑖
) (27) 
However, as the previous literature also stated, it is highly expected that the above approach can 
generate estimates with large variance and some prices can be four or five times the observed new 
price in the post introduction period as reported below: 
 PL Tier  
References Retailer 
entry 
NB entry Standard 
PL entry 
Economy 
PL entry 
Premium 
PL entry 
Introductions 
at traditional 
retailers 
Hausman and 
Leibtag (2007) 
x     
Pauwels and 
Srinivasan (2004) 
  x   
Bonfrer and 
Chintagunta (2004) 
  x   
Haausman and 
Leonard (2002) 
 x    
Arnade et al. (2011)  x    
This study    x x 
Introductions 
at discounters 
Lin et al. (2012) 
 x    
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Table 4-8 Virtual Prices by using Hausman and Leonard (2002)'s approach 
 
Asda Sainsbury's Safeway Somerfield 
Virtual Economy PL Price/Kg (€) 4.23 3.60 4.83 5.70 
Virtual Premium PL Price/Kg (€) 2.56 1.07 1.98 N.A. 
Descriptive Statistics after the PL tier introductions 
Table 4-9 Market share (%) before and after PL tier introductions 
 
 
Asda Sainsbury's Safeway Somerfield 
Cereal Market share before (%) 17.18 29.79 12.74 2.16 
 Market share after (%) 19.07 27.02 12.84 3.25 
 Δ (percentage point) +1.89 -2.77 +0.10 +1.09 
      
Soup Market share before (%) 23.73 24.67 16.65 N.A. 
 Market share after (%) 27.73 25.89 17.32 N.A. 
 Δ (percentage point) +4.00 +1.22 +0.67 N.A. 
 
Table 4-10 Number of SKU change in NBs before and after PL tier introductions 
 
 
Asda Sainsbury's Safeway Somerfield 
Cereal # of NB SKUs Before 104 122 83 89 
 # of NB SKUs After 158 144 99 128 
 Δ in SKUs +54 +22 +16 +39 
      
Soup # of NB SKUs Before 135 161 235 N.A. 
 # of NB SKUs After 166 222 204 N.A. 
 Δ in SKUs +31 +61 -31 N.A. 
 
